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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the anatomy of Kreps' research program. That 
program probes the mysteries of social process, social structure and 
social organization through the use of a code of structural elements -- 
domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A).
The impetus for this study derives from my concern that a common 
taxonomy of structural elements applied to ostensibly similar empirical 
situations will not always yield common results. To explain such 
outcomes, three studies are appraised with regards to methodology, units 
and focus of analysis and, finally, application of Kreps' code. These 
studies are as follows: origins -- the search for emergent organization; 
social networks -- the search for structural linkages between existing 
organizations; and restructuring of extant organizations. The 
methodology for my study involves an application of methodological 
commitments derived from the origins study onto case materials (the 
empirical and conceptual content) relative to the social network study. 
This sensitizing procedure also analyzes origins data by the methodology 
employed in the social networks study.
Of major interest is the fact that each of these studies reveals 
some important dimensions of structural statics and dynamics. It is 
noted that these three studies are mutually constitutive of temporally 
and spatially bounded events involving individual and social entities. 
The point is made, finally, that these conceptual similarities are 
masked by different theoretical and conceptual meanings for the elements 
employed by the studies. Moreover, these differences affect the 
application of Kreps' structural code. A call is made within the final 
section for an integrated and inclusive approach to these complementary 
facets of empirical reality in order to 1) illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each methodology as they now stand and 2) thus avoid the 
contrasting portraits of similar events painted by the discrete and 
parochial studies.
ORIGINS, NETWORKS, AND RESTRUCTURING 
AN ANALYSIS OF THREE METHODOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION
The following study involves a critical examination of Kreps' 
structural code as it is applied across a diverse empirical and 
conceptual landscape. It may be described also as an exercise, the 
culmination of which, hovers somewhere between epistemological discovery 
and methodological critique. I was, at times, hard pressed to 
differentiate between the two. One of the strengths of the Kreps' 
research program is its implementation of a common, alphabetic code of 
structural elements -- (D) Domain, (T) Tasks, (R) Resources, and (A) 
Activities -- the properties of which are considered to represent basic 
building blocks of social structure. The conceptual and linguistic 
common ground provided by the code facilitates description of various 
structural outcomes which result from the association between 
individuals, with varying commitments, across diverse events. These 
events have as their catalyst, in all cases, some form of natural 
disaster.
One of these structural outcomes of human association, better 
known as organization, is said to be in existence if, and when, all four 
elements are documented in logical conjunction. That is to say, the four 
elements describe and characterize the social actions occuring within 
some identifiable collectivity. This theoretical property space, as 
defined by the code, was employed to search for instances of
2
organization which were in some sense emergent (Saunders and Kreps,
1987). In other studies (e.g., Linn and Kreps, 1988), the focal unit of
analysis was not emergent organization, but, rather, emergent patterns
of restructuring by existing organizations; again, using the theoretical
properties of the elements to describe these structural alterations. The
latest research design to implement the code, involves documenting
social network links between two existing organizational units
(organizational dyads) (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988).
It was findings from the social network study which provided the
initial impetus for my study. While the intent of the network study was
to observe and describe relative degrees of interdependence between
dyadic members, the investigators were also interested in the
possibility of indentifying emergent organizations that resulted from
interorganizational processes. Both the origins study (that which sought
emergent organization) and the network study dealt with similar units of
analysis across ostensibly similar environmental contingencies; however,
during the course of the network study, no instances of emergent
organization were located. Such inconsistent methodological outcomes led
Kreps (1988) to say,
While we assume that the absence of four-element forms of 
association identified from [the network] data is not an artifact 
of methodology, the reader is cautioned to be aware of that 
possibility. Studying organization as "thing" and as "process" at 
the same time is fraught with a number of methodological and 
epistemological dilemmas that need to be given sustained attention 
(p. 18).
This research is the first installment ih line with Kreps' call for 
"sustained attention". „
While all three studies have as their intellectual core Kreps'
4structural code and explicit theoretical logic, they, nevertheless, do 
not share common methodological and epistemological commitments 
(Alexander, 1982). And as it seems, contrasting or dissimilar 
commitments result in essentially different applications of the code. By 
analogy, even though the tools, medium, canvas and model may be the 
same, if one artist is concerned with color, one with substance, and one 
with form, each of the resulting portraits will be distinctive -- 
complementary facets in interpretation of shared experience.
The research design of this study is essentially exploratory and 
sensitizing in nature. As a critique, it does not apply Kreps' 
descriptive code and logic in the analysis of a particular social 
phenomenon, but, rather, attempts to define the impact of particular 
units of analysis and commitments on the consequent applications of the 
code. The actual methodology employed a cross analysis of case materials 
from, for example, the origins study by the unique set of commitments 
found within the social network's methodology. The referent questions 
became, thus: How are methodological and conceptual outcomes from one 
study altered, when analyzed by the methodological dictates of parallel, 
yet, in many ways, divergent studies? Put succinctly: What results when 
emergent organizations from the origins study are reanalyzed in terms of 
social networks? And what is the outcome if organizational dyad are 
reanalyzed in terms of the special properties of the origins 
methodology?
The methodology described above has elements of a content 
analysis, that is, in particular, a sensitivity to both reliability and 
validity with respect to the application of Kreps' elements of social
5structure. It also goes one step further, however, by analyzing both the 
commonalities and differences among the three different methodologies 
and the effect of different methodological and epistemological 
perspectives upon the unique, and rather explicit, prerogatives set 
forth in the use of conceptual taxonomies.
In conclusion, this study, even though grounded by empirical 
data, is also interwoven with the conceptual; because of this, an 
attempt to define various issue-laden and controversial concepts is also 
required. For instance, the first section below represents a tentative 
exploration into the enigmatic, and sometimes metaphoric, construct 
known as social "structure". The intent here is to compare and contrast 
the "nests of commitments" of social theorists such as Collins, Wallace, 
and Mayhew, as they wrestle with the "reality" of social structure.
These theorists are felt to exemplify a (sometimes tenuous) paradigmatic 
continuum, the polar ends of which represent the schism between 
interpretivist and structuralist approaches to the observation of social 
phenomenon. Within this discussion, Kreps' unique brand of structuralism 
is introduced. The following section (2) outlines Kreps' research 
program, with the intent of bringing light to bear on both his 
commitment to the reality of social structure and his methodological 
assault on social forms of association through the use of a conceptual 
taxonomy. This section also introduces a thorough analysis of Kreps' 
structural code, as well as some of the critiques and problems which 
various reviewers have voiced concerning it. A third section will 
address the methods and issues which characterize the origins, social 
networks, and restructuring methodologies. And with this backdrop as
6illustration, the research agenda proposed in this study, outlined 
above, will be exposited in detail. The concluding section (4) presents 
an expose of what were considered key issues and interesting discoveries 
uncovered along the way -- and illustrates the importance of self- 
critical, and objective, assessments of ongoing-research programs.
7SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THEORY
What do sociologists mean when they refer to the notion of social 
structure? Is it a tangible phenomenon or merely an ephemeral, yet 
heuristic metaphor? Assuming it is "real", how is it constructed? How is 
it maintained? While the questions are formidable and fundamental, there 
are a few social theorists who have attempted to answer them. Wallace 
(1983), for example, holds that social structure is constituted from 
"interorganism behavior regularities", while Collins (1981) reconstructs 
social structure in terms of "interaction ritual chains". Both notions 
bespeak patterns of action which achieve continuity across and within 
the confines of time and space. And both construe "the social" in terms 
of the phenomena occurring between individuals and not within them. Both 
Wallace's and Collins' approach and define social structure -- i.e., the 
reality of social structure -- in terms of microinteraction.
Mayhew (1980,1981), in his turn, also takes note of 
interrelationships between activity systems, but arrives at different 
conceptual outcomes. Social structure, for Mayhew (1980), is best 
understood in terms of "social networks"; that is, the sum of 
interrelations in which individuals stand with respect to each other. 
These interrelations are studied in terms of the "organization of 
information" (symbols) and the "organization of materials" (tools). 
Probably the key difference between Mayhew's notion of social structure, 
and that of Wallace or Collins, is that Mayhew gives entity status to
8social structure. This notion, borne out of the Durkheimian tradition, 
advances the idea that empirical expressions and forms of social 
structure may be analyzed on their own terms -- social structure sui 
generis. Here, properties of structure manifest themselves through 
processes which have little to do with the plans, thoughts or desires of 
individual participants. Such emergent properties as the societal 
division of labor and organizational hierarchies are the unique domain 
of Mayhew's structuralism. In this regard, elements of social structure 
not only come to define and regulate micro structure and process, but 
also stand as co-equal realities with the protoplasm of the human 
species. Contrary to Wallace and Collins, then, explanations of 
structural processes do not necessarily reduce to individual behavior.
Perhaps Wallace, Collins and Mayhew, each (in his own way), would 
agree with Durkheim's point that "society is not a mere sum of 
individuals. Rather, the system formed by their association represents a 
specific reality which has its own characteristics" (1938:103). In other 
words, Wallace's "regularities", Collins' "rituals" and Mayhew's 
"organization" relate (1) behaviors or actions which come to be arranged 
in ordered and consistent patterns (across time and space) which (2) 
constitute a unique reality. For example, both Wallace (1983) and Mayhew 
(1983) invoke hierarchy to conceptualize what vertical differentiation 
occurs between social phenomenon as a result of patterns of individual 
association. Thus, social structure is constructed from patterns of 
individual association which may be "aggregated and reaggregated into 
collectivities of increasing size and complexity" (Wallace, 1983:170). 
Examples of these aggregated forms would include families,
9organizations, bureaucracies, communities, cities, social movements, 
societies, and so on. According to this view, hierarchical boundaries 
are not static nor are they completely arbitrary; nor, according to 
Wallace, should they be regarded as reducible to either the individual 
or social structure. Nevertheless, debate has been rather constant as to 
the "reality" of either the individual and his actions (e.g., ". . .only 
real people can do things" (Collins 1975:12)) or the structural order 
for a given population (. . . socialized man [is] first and foremost . .
. a moment--and, above all, the object--of the social totality" (Adorno 
1976:242)).
Wallace has said, "it is always and only the analyst who decides 
what is and is not a social phenomena (sic), and who decides, therefore, 
which participants, behaviors, and regularities constitute the 
phenomena" (1983:15). Collins (1981), for instance, views social order 
as a unique consequence of social action. Order and the resultant social 
structure, therefore, cannot be viewed as having properties and 
processes unique to other social entities (e.g., individuals). For 
Mayhew, in contrast, patterns of social action are predicated upon 
conditions of the social order. Emergent properties of aggregated 
actions and properties of individuals, therefore, stand as unique social 
entities; entities which spring into existence, change and "die" despite 
the protestations of individuals.
Moving ahead to Kreps' treatment of social structure, we find that 
individuals and social entities are treated as co-equal realities; 
behaviors and rituals of social action are represented by forms of human 
association; and regularities point to the temporal and spatial
10
dimensions of these "forms". Thus, Kreps speaks of "forms of
association" in an effort to avoid reification of either the individual
or social structure. Forms of association represent a "third reality";
similar to the "third reality" Simmel (1950) proposes:
It is . . . not true that reality can be attributed only to 
properly ultimate units, and not to phenomena in which these units 
find their forms. Any form (and a form is always a synthesis) is 
something added by a synthesizing subject.
More to the point, Kreps speaks of all social phenomena as being
represented by an ontological triangle of individual, unit, and
synthesis of ultimate units, or forms of association. Social structure,
is therefore conceived as a dialectical synthesis between the individual
and social entities, or between action and order. In sum, Kreps (1988)
concludes:
At the most basic level, we agree with Alexander (1982) that 
social structure should be defined as problem of action and 
problem of order. The problem of action is one of determining how 
social units are created and sustained by individuals. The problem 
of order is one of determining how individual thoughts and 
behaviors are shaped and controlled by social units. . . .
Interpreted as social action, structure is in a constant state of 
becoming something else (Berger and Luckmann 1966). But the new 
can never be divorced from what is already there (Warriner 1970). 
Interpreted as social order, structure is an omnipresent force, 
one analyzed on its own terms (Mayhew 1982). But what is always 
there is constantly transforming (Giddens 1979). Interpreted 
multidimensiona11v as action and order, structure is an 
unrelenting paradox (p. 46; emphasis in the original).
Thus, according to Kreps, to describe "forms of human association", if
this is indeed the basic subject matter of sociology, the analysis must
inevitably include both the individual social actor or agent,
conceptualized in terms of social action, and the omnipresent context or
structural environment, conceptualized as the social order.
While reconciliation between rival factions is always desirable,
11
arriving at such a point is rarely easy. If, for example, Wallace and 
Collins do not assign the same entity status to "forms" of human 
interaction, they are not likely to fathom the "paradoxical" nature of 
social structure. Similarly, if Mayhew remains unconvinced that 
individuals are cognitively capable of sustaining such "supraindividual" 
structures such as the division of labor, then complex forms of social 
reality could not be constructed from chains of interaction rituals. The 
viability of Kreps' contentions as a possible "middle ground" rests in 
part on whether or not theorists of different persuasions can be 
convinced that 1) events occurring within and between human populations 
are truly recurrent across divergent empirical contingencies, and 2) 
these recurrent events can be described fully and precisely using a 
taxonomy of four structural elements (discussed below).
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KREPS' RESEARCH PROGRAM
Utilizing disasters as "organization-creating catalysts", a large 
part of the research by Kreps et al. has centered around 1) defining 
positively and, thereby, identifying instances of emergent 
"organization" and 2) exploring the activity processes between unit 
and/or individuals which yield "organized" outcomes. The circumstance of 
disaster seems exceptional for this task because the emergency period 
disrupts "taken for granted" routines. Within this context Kreps 
attempts to discern the difference between the presence and absence of 
organizational entities; for, as he states, within this context 
"existence of organization is often an issue rather than a given for 
these entities" (Kreps 1988b:1). Furthermore, a structural code is 
employed "for the purposes of describing how nascent organizations 
emerge, established ones restructure over time, and either nascent or 
established types go out of existence" (Kreps 1988b:2). By not taking 
organization (or the activity processes from which they are constructed) 
for granted, Kreps explores such basic questions as: What is 
organization? When do the disaster-related activities among social units 
reflect organization? What distinguishes organization from other forms 
of human association?
In the pursuit of answers to these questions, the description of 
forms of human association, conceived as stages of organizing or re­
organizing, is the result of "continuous feedback between empirical
13
events --as revealed by the archives -- and a structural code (A, R, T, 
D) . . ." (Bosworth and Kreps, 1988). In what follows, Kreps' structural 
code, the resulting taxonomy, and some of the conceptual issues which 
relate to each will be explored.
The Structural Code
According to Kreps (1988c), "A structural code is a system of 
symbols (the genetic alphabet is an example) which serves as a basic 
building block of some subject matter. The symbols . . . are sequenced 
in various ways to classify objects of inquiry at different taxonomic 
levels" (p. 2). Kreps' structural code is composed from four such 
symbols, each of which represent some essential building block of social 
structure - - domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A). 
The conceptual, "core properties" of each are highlighted below (Kreps 
1988:8-9):
Domain (D)
Domains are bounded spheres of human activity which point to 
the existence of a unit and what it does. As things, domains are 
collectively represented in the communications of (1) those 
included in these spheres of activity and (2) those who interact 
with them at the boundaries of the unit (Levine and White 1961; 
Thompson 1967; Haas and Drabek 1973). Domains are objective 
(external) and in the Durkheimian sense real and constraining.
They are also subjective (internal) and in the Weberian sense 
individually created and legitimated (Durkheim 1938; Weber 1968; 
Giddens 1976, 1979; Alexander 1982a, 1982b, 1983). A unit 
specification does not imply anything else about the existence of 
organization.
Tasks (T)
Tasks are specifications of a division of labor for the 
enactment of human activity. As things, they independently define 
the unit quality of social action. Whle domain represents social 
structure as open system that is legitimated internally and 
externally, tasks point to it as closed system that is structured
14
from within (Thompson 1967; Perrow 1967). As part of a process, 
tasks are a unique expression of structure.
Human and Material Resources (R)
Resources are the material technologies and subjective
attributes of human populations. Their presence in a process as
things comes to be defined with reference to the unit quality of 
social structure, but they may be mobilized prior to or following 
the emergence of domains and tasks. Resources are both static and 
dynamic: static because their relevance as a part of organization 
is conditioned by the external reality of domains and tasks; 
dynamic because domains and tasks are the social constructions of 
human beings.
Activities (A)
Activities are the interdependent Tconjoinedl actions of human 
populations which at once establish and are conditioned bv social 
structure. As things, activities are the remaining social means of 
organization which, although analytically distinct, relate 
symmetrically with its interpretation as thing (unit) and process 
(response). Activities are no more or less conceptually important 
than the remaining three elements. Certainly D, T, R, and A all 
are grounded in the actor, as reality and creator of the unit. 
However, each is equally grounded in the unit, as reality and 
constraining force (Warriner 1956, 1970; Giddens 1979; Alexander 
1982a).
On a theoretical level, Kreps' structural code aspires to capture 
the importance of, for example, both subjectivity and objectivity (the 
immaterial and the material), and both the individual and social unit as 
objects of inquiry. The code, furthermore, endeavors to describe 
organization, one particular form of association, as both a static and 
dynamic phenomenon --as "thing" and as "process". An underlying premise 
of Kreps' work relates to what he feels is the "paradox of social 
structure". Consonant with the idea that social reality is "nothing more 
than streams of events", organization exists as a temporally and 
spatially definable entity which is constantly in flux, but this 
transformational quality is constrained by what already exists in its
15
historically relevant environment.
Analytically, "each element is . . . distinct from the others and 
relates equally with structure as unit and as process" (Kreps, 1988:47).
This means that (1) each of the elements be considered to be unique
expressions of social structure, (2) the existence of organization is 
predicated upon the co-presence of the elements, and (3) no pattern in
the arrangement of the elements may be assumed (Kreps, 1988:47).
Expressed as "forms of association", the arrangement of the elements in 
all logically possible combinations and permutations results in a 
taxonomy of sixty-four social structural processes. The derived taxonomy 
includes 4 one-element forms, 12 two-element forms, 24 three-element 
forms, and 24 four-element forms (see Table 1).
Dedending on the nature of a particular study's "objects of 
inquiry" (restated below as the parochial units and foci of analysis in 
any given study), distinct combinations of these elements symbolize 
varying social forms and functions. In the origins methodology, for 
example, only the four-element forms are sufficient for organization to 
exist, the remaining 40 types come to represent stages in a nascent 
organization's "birth" (Kreps, 1985). This temporal and conceptual 
evolution of nascent entities remains a somewhat unique property space 
of the origins use of the code. One of the findings of this study, which 
will be discussed at length below, relates to the fact that varying 
units and foci of analysis come to affect both the methodological 
application of the elements and their taxonomic significance.
First, however, the following installment will further elucidate, 
with the help of various critical reviewers, the conceptual significance
16
TABLE 1: Taxonomy of Forms of Association
Organizational Three Two One
Forms Element Element Element
Forms Forms Forms
D-T-
D-T-
D-R-
D-R-
D-A-
D-A-
T-R-
T-R-
T-A-
T-A-
T-D-
T-D-
R-A-
R-A-
R-D-
R-D-
R-T-
R-T-
A-D-
A-D-
A-T-
A-T-
A-R-
A-R-
R-A
A-R
A-T
T-A
T-R
R-T
A-D
D-A
D-R
R-D
R-A
A-R
D-T
T-D
T-A
A-T
D-A
A-D
T-R
R-T
D-R
R-D
D-T
T-D
D-T-R
D-T-A
D-R-A
D-R-T
D-A-T
D-A-R
T-R-A
T-R-D
T-A-D
T-A-R
T-D-R
T-D-A
R-A-D
R-A-T
R-D-T
R-D-A
R-T-D
R-T-A
A-D-T
A-D-R
A-T-D
A-T-R
A-R-D
A-R-T
D-T
D-R
D-A
T-R
T-A
T-D
R-A
R-D
R-T
A-D
A-T
A-R
D
T
R
A
17
and unique theoretical property spaces of each element in Kreps' 
structural code.
Criticisms of Kreps' Structural Code
It should be noted that various reviewers have had difficulty 
conceptualizing the adequacy of each of the elements in capturing either 
the unique dynamics of social organizing or the empirical properties of 
social structure. These difficulties, undoubtedly, stem from Kreps' use 
of taxonomy to describe social structure, in general, and perhaps the 
relative significance or theoretical importance of each of the elements 
in particular (Turner, 1988; Wallace, 1988). Other problems are 
methodological in character. In what follows, the attempt will be made 
to step into Kreps' shoes and, accordingly, try to deal with some of the 
criticisms which have been encountered.
Activities (A)
Collins (1981; 1986 [personal correspondence between Collins and 
Kreps]), for example, building from his conception of social structure 
as "interaction ritual chains", sees within the element activities (A) 
all the requisite material (i.e., human beings) for organization (and 
social structure) to emerge. As is implied by "interaction ritual 
chains", social action, under the rubric ritual, has both a meaningful 
and purposive connotation. Thus, through "micro-translation", social 
structure becomes the aggregation of meaningful and purposive 
interaction. Kreps, however, uses activities (A) to relate more the form 
than the content of social action.
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As an illustration of their differences, Collins' (1988) thoughts 
in describing tactical warfare as "deliberate organizational breakdown" 
(p. 297) can be used. It is Collins' contention that the battle is won 
by that army which is able to maintain its organizational integrity as 
it forces the enemy's organization to the breaking point. Using as the 
conceptual take-off point, "interaction ritual chains", it might seem 
that breakdown would occur if and when key participants (links in the 
chain) are "lost" (e.g., killed) in the confrontation. Interestingly, 
however, in terms of the bureaucratically structured modern army Collins 
(1988) is led to observe, "At a larger level, an entire army is defeated 
when its overall structure reaches a level of chaos at which minimal 
coordination and supply is no longer possible" (p.298).
Meaning and purpose between organizational participants is 
important for organization to exist, however, no amount of normative 
consensus will save an army from itself once supply routes are cut, 
information lines severed, and its coordination disrupted. Thus, 
empirically, "interaction ritual chains" seem to become more and more 
contingent on macrostructural processes at ever higher levels of 
aggregate complexity, thereby also losing points in the battle for 
explanatory importance. In sum, while "organization", for Collins, is 
attributed to micro-processes, ironically, "disorganization" is mainly a 
macro phenomenon.
On another front, Collins and Turner (1988), for instance, have 
posed an interesting argument relating to activities (A) which goes 
something like this: How is the element activities (A) to be made 
analytically distinct if, in every event of organizing, what is
19
happening can only be observed through the actions of participants. In
other words, are not all actions related to the organizing event some
form of activities (A)? The answer would have to be yes, if one were
committed to the level of microinteractional processes and the study of
meaningful actions undertaken by willful actors (what Kreps refers to as
"interpretive sociology").
Kreps, however, in employing activities (A), is seeking the
structural correlates of some human population or populations conjointly
engaged in any possible event of organizing. And in partial answer to
the argument above, Kreps observes:
It might be asked: isn't A logically primary because conjoined 
action depicts structure in its most elemental form? I resist an 
affirmative response to this
question. . . . [To] be conjoined in some fashion is to beg 
questions about degrees of interdependence. Thus certainly 
activities can be described, and in important ways--numerically, 
temporally, and spatially--without making any reference to D, T, 
and R (1988:141-2).
In point of fact, it must be said that the theoretical significance of
the element activities (A) has been slightly altered depending on the
focus of a particular study: origins, restructuring, or social networks.
The idea of conjoint actions is more cogent to the network study whereas
activities (A) relates to the spatial and temporal continuity between
interacting social units (e.g., organizations). And the numerical
criterion for conjoined actions is contingent on other factors such as
the predominant disaster related activities of some participant unit.
Nonetheless, the importance of structural correlates to
interacting populations, relating to the sheer numbers of individuals
amalgamated in time and space, is not a unique concern for Kreps.
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Numerous theorists have posited size (i.e., population size) as an 
important generator of social forms (Mayhew 1980,1981,1983; Simmel 
1950). And an important question for Kreps, and others, is to what 
degree the sheer numbers of participants engaged in conjoined action 
between two social units represents a mere description of the some human 
population or a partial explanation for any consequent, emerging social 
form?
Regarding time and space, there is really little argument that 
anything "social", at some point, communicates the "meeting" of two or 
more actors, for whatever reason, upon the world's stage. Wallace 
(1983), makes the same case, by separating his "interorganism behavioral 
regularities" into physical and psychical categories (i.e. between 
social and cultural structure) whereby time and space, then, become part 
and parcel of any description of this physical dimension. While he 
seemed to have a great deal of difficulty relating to Kreps' research 
(see his critique in Kreps (1988)), on this point at least, he seems to 
concur. For example, when proposing a generic definition of 
"interorganism behavioral regularities", Wallace states, initially, "The 
definition thus denotes merely a joint occurrence sometime and/or 
somewhere. . . . "  (1983:22). He then describes how these joint 
occurrences may be defined by temporal and spatial coordinates, but 
implies by way of "regularities", "patterned," "structured, "organized," 
or "ordered" activity. Additionally, Wallace contends, "Because the 
regularities may be observed across any distance in space and/or time, 
some social phenomena may be described as extensive, sparse, or rare, 
while others may be described as concentrated, densely packed, or
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ordinary" (Wallace 1983:22).
Even though Wallace does not disclose the criterion by which we 
may make judgments about the "concentration" or "sparseness" of human 
activities, clearly his definition relates a concern with time, space 
and number. Once again, a crucial difference between Wallace and Kreps 
(and Collins for that matter) is that Wallace constructs organization 
from patterns of interorganism behavior--aggregated "regularities" from 
role-performances to role-performance sets to social situses to social 
structure (1983:79). Again, in this view, macro structures and processes 
are created through micro-interaction and described through concepts 
which define one-on-one intercourse (e.g., roles). Time, space and 
number, then, are only useful as a description of conjoined action 
between actors where both actors and actions are assigned meaning prior 
to enactment. Conjoined action, thus, becomes synonymous with 
"patterned," "structured," "organized," or "ordered" action -- in 
essence, interdependent action.
Kreps is inclined to view, "conjoined action [as] not necessarily 
interdependent action. [Interdependent action] is very much tied to 
manifest resources (R) and the flow of verbal and written communication 
which specify domains (D) and tasks (T)"(1988:140). In other words, 
conjoined action has but a tendency to become patterned or maybe 
organized; furthermore, this "tendency" is not necessarily contingent on 
microinteraction.
Resources (R)
Perhaps the most easily grasped and understood element in the 
code, in relating to organizational requisites, is resources (R).
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However, in keeping with Kreps and Bosworth's (1988) caveat, "It is
essential to show . . . that the presence of one [element] does not
necessitate the other" (p.15), establishing the nature of resources (R)
is apparently deceiving. For example, Turner (1988) ponders the
question, if "people are resources, how can one have activity without
people?" Naturally, the answer to the question, can one have activity
without people, is no. Kreps (1988) explains:
Probably the key question with resources is how to distinguish A 
(activities) from R (human and material resources) if people are 
relevant to the definition of both. The poin-t we are trying to 
make here is that the presence of resources does not necessarily 
mean that the actions of individual or social units are conjoined 
in any meaningful sense of the term. The resources are just there- 
-whether they are supplies, equipment, money, or the human 
capacities of public officials, employees, volunteers, or 
bystanders (p.139).
One really can not fault Turner or any other reviewer for such
inquiries, because on an intuitive level all actions would seem to
constitute activities (A) and, in many cases, activities (A) are indeed
incorporated into a larger effort as resources (R); for example, when
ongoing activities of "unofficial helpers" are merged with the
activities of more formalized units. In this example, it would seem that
the "unofficial helpers" have become an enabling resource (R) for
further action.
One of the problems, empirically, in reconciling and agreeing upon 
the appearance of resources (R) is that the element incorporates such a 
conceivably large reservoir of human and material "stuff". What is not 
clear to reviewers is that resources do not become resources (R), in the 
methodological sense, until they are either utilized by someone or 
something or explicitly transferred from one unit to another. And the
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requirements of "utilization" and "transfer" change according to the 
particular study or focus of study. This point will be taken up again in 
a later section.
Conceptually, again, Kreps is strict in his requirement that the 
appearance of conjoined activity (A) or resources (R) not necessarily 
imply interdependence. Interdependence, for Kreps, describes the 
situation where two units, engaged in some sort of conjoined endeavor, 
are "dependent" on the other in one way or another for the continuance 
of this operation. It was Thompson (1967) who brought degrees of 
interdependence into the conceptual limelight when he depicted the 
relationship of branches of a larger organization as representing either 
"pooled," "sequential," or "reciprocal" interdependence. All of these 
forms involved, in some way, the flow of resources as a prerequisite for 
the efficacy and survivability of an organization. Kreps' point remains 
that a transfer of resources (R) does not necessarily involve 
interdependence between two organizational entities in regards to some 
inclusive endeavor or entity.
At times, substantive results from Kreps' research tie in to 
certain tenets of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald,
1977). Leaving behind issues dealing with the politics of social 
movements, a fundamental tenet of the resource mobilization approach is 
that collective action and organizational viability in noninstitutional 
settings are directly linked with the ability to acquire and mobilize 
key resources (Jenkins, 1983). In accordance with Kreps' findings, it is 
notable that of 28 cases of emergent organization comprised of other 
organizations (from an origins study; see Saunders and Kreps, 1987), in
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no instance were resources (R) the last element of four elements 
involved. Moreover, there is only one example where resource (R) was the 
next to last element evidenced -- that of D-T-R-A or Kreps' notion of 
formal organization. Thus, in 96% of the emergent organizations located, 
resources (R) accounted for either the first or second element.
Resource (R) acquisition also seems critically involved in the 
legitimation of an emerging entity's domain (D). For example, in 
Saunders and Kreps (1987), emergent organizations which began D-R or R-D 
accounted for 19 of 28 cases observed. This could mean that an 
externally legitimated domain (D) resulted in greater ease in acquiring 
resources (R) (i.e., D-R) or that the mobilization of resources (R) 
resulted in domain (D) legitimation for whatever group was able to 
utilize them (i.e., R-D). Thompson (1967), in his discussion of the 
"synthetic organization", describes the R-D situation in this way: 
"authority to coordinate the use of resources is attributed to--forced 
upon--the individual or groups which by happenstance is at the 
crossroads of the two kinds of necessary information, resource 
availability and need (p.52)."
This observation either points out an extremely important 
organizational dynamic -- the securing of resources (R) serves as an 
enabling or focusing point around which organization is possible -- or 
it relates a methodological bias. That is to say, since resources (R) 
are defined so broadly (i.e., both human and material) perhaps their 
location is biased in terms of the overall ease of identification. 
Regardless, it is true that transfer or exchange of resources between 
organizations is an integral part of the environment of any existing
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organization (Thompson, 1967). Indeed, the majority of social network 
linkages noted in Kreps' network study (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988) 
involved resources (R). Equally, the efficacy and life-expectancy of an 
emergent organization is tied to the acquisition of crucial enabling 
resources. In other words, the importance of resources is undeniable; 
however, as a piece in a methodological puzzle, (R) is still being fine 
tuned.
Tasks (T)
Both resources (R) and tasks (T) are critical components in the
research literature on both organizations and collective behavior. On
the organizational side, Perrow (1979), for example, considers resources
(R), in the form of technologies, a crucial predictor of organizational
form (e.g., the respective division of labor). For organizational
management theorists, who necessarily take organization for granted, the
key to organizational rationality lies in its control structure or
bureaucratically structured division of labor. On the other side of the
same coin, for some theorists concerned with collective behavior
(especially social movements), the acquisition and mobilization of
resources (R) constitute both crucial enabling or constraining factors.
While Ralph Turner (and Killian, 1987), in his turn, relays concern over
the emergence of an elementary division of labor (Tasks) within
collectivities through his emergent norm thesis.
Kreps (1988), in an integrative effort, relates his conception of
tasks (T) in this way:
Here it is useful to recall Durkheim's critique of utilitarianism 
and Simon's (1956) questioning of classical rationality as the 
ultimate explanation for a division of labor. Durkheim's 
utilitarian actor would never agree to uphold a division of labor;
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and Simon's cognitively limited actor would never be able to 
sustain one. As a result, both Durkheim and Simon argue that it is 
essential to conceive of the division of labor as, at least in 
part, an external reality. That reality commands commitment and 
provides coherence. Durkheim expresses the former as normative 
unity through collective representations. Simon expresses the 
latter as cognitive unity through organizational vocabularies 
(Perrow 1972).
Seeking to avoid possible tautological reasoning explicit in the search 
for "collective representation", Kreps insists that tasks (T) be in 
evidence through written or verbal communications (Kreps, 1988). Thus, 
when Turner is puzzled over the classification of tasks (T) (since tasks 
(T) ostensibly contain a subjective component) and asks, "how is this to 
be determined? Surely not by probing the depths of individual psyches!" 
We might ask the same for Turner's emergent norm perspective. How 
widespread does this emergent norm have to be? How is its existence to 
be determined?
For Kreps, any given human population has but the capacity to 
organize; interdependence is not given. The appearance of flow charts, 
bureaucratic schematics, and job descriptions facilitate this capacity 
by providing participants, in any given organization, with a cognitive 
backdrop for action. That job holders are frequently overheard to say, 
"That's not my job!" or "That matter is not under my jurisdiction", 
gives us a clue to organizational participant's understandings about the 
nature of their work. Obviously, the division of labor evidenced in 
written and verbal communications does not an organization make.
However, collective agreement over a division of labor, implicitly or 
explicitly, as evidenced in communiques, makes for a very potent force.
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As Collins states, "the power of an organization is in its being 
taken for granted." This taken for granted reality makes up the 
transhistorical reality of "collective representations" which Durkheim 
described as being characterized by "exteriority, priority and 
constraint" (cited in Turner, 1987). In other words, people act towards 
these collective representations as if they had the same entity quality 
as a mountain range. Thus, people talk of "fighting city hall" or the 
"establishment" for the same reasons they may climb Mount Everest-- 
"because it's there". The same holds true for organizational 
participants. If they have their actions defined by written or verbal 
"understandings", then these "understandings" give organization an 
exterior, prior, and constraining quality. However, that organizations 
can and eventually do "wink" out of existence (Mayhew 1983), suggests 
that the viability of any organized entity is a contingent process; 
within the strength of the taken for granted lie the seeds of 
destruction.
The process of establishing tasks (T) empirically is sometimes run 
aground by questions and issues such as: Is the requirement of written 
or verbal evidence of a task structure biased in terms of larger units? 
Or, in dealing with units of varying complexity which may be situated 
within larger systems, are we dealing with a division of labor or a 
division of authority? Is there a difference? Related to questions of 
power, who, within a unit, may create a task structure? And does an 
emergent task structure immediately apply to the unit as a whole or to a 
smaller segment, within a larger unit, which may be involved in a 
separate arena of activities? Each of these questions will be given
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sustained attention below.
Domain (D~)
Thompson (1967) introduced the concept of "domain" in this way:
Domain . . . defines a set of expectations both for members of an 
organization and for others with whom they interact, about what 
the organization will and will not do. It provides, although 
imperfectly, an image of the organization's role in a larger 
system, which in turn serves as a guide for the ordering of action 
in certain directions and not in others. The concept of domain . .
. can be clearly separated from individual goals or motives. 
Regardless . . ., members of hospitals somehow conceive of their 
organizations as oriented around medical care, and this conception 
is reinforced by those with whom the members interact (p.29).
Kreps is certainly getting at the same thing in describing domains as
(1) identifying bounded entities and what they do and (2) providing
ideas of shared membership and common spheres of activity. The existence
of domain (D), for Kreps, "symbolizes the open system character of
organizing by providing external legitimacy of an entity and what it
does" (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988).
Domain (D), like the other elements, has met with some amount of
incredulity on the part of reviewers. Turner (1988), once again, poses
some astute questions. He observes:
The [elements] are applied on the basis of some agreement as to 
what a social unit is doing. But agreement can be at different 
levels. An ad hoc crew of volunteer emergency workers like those 
described by Louis Zurcher (1983) can develop their own consensus, 
with only vague awareness of what they are doing in the larger 
community. But from the examples that Bosworth and Kreps present, 
the establishment of a domain seems to depend more on the decision 
of some higher body representing the whole community--perhaps even 
a body whose authority predates the disaster. . . . Why should 
Domain have to be legitimated at a;. higher community level than 
Tasks (p.167, emphasis in the original)?
As a student of collective behavior, it is no surprise that Turner
worries that Kreps' research might by biased in terms of "continuity
29
rather than emergence". Indeed, there could be collective agreement 
within a volunteer group as to what they are doing and why. This group 
could even manage to uphold a simple task structure. However, until the 
activities of this group are observed and legitimated by relevant others 
-- at a higher community level -- its entity status wavers on the subtle 
distinction between "an organization" and "organized activity". For 
Kreps, external recognition and legitimation of a bounded entity is a 
necessary requisite for organization to exist, else the situation where 
all relevant disaster related activity be assumed as organization merely 
because it is not "disorganized".
Be that as it may, Turner does lay out two important points: 1) 
Zurcher's ad hoc volunteer group is necessarily going to have more 
difficulty than a more established unit in gaining external 
legitimation; and 2) domain, as a term which characterizes distinct 
spheres of activities, is decided on the basis of researcher agreement. 
On the basis of this criterion and assuming that the number of disaster 
domains is finite (in Kreps, 1988 (p.16), 29 domains were recognized), 
domains may be divided into intelligible categories which capture not 
only the perceptions of the observer but may also translate readily into 
the way those who are being observed interpret their action. Enacting 
units and participants, however, may lay claim to several domains. For 
example, a sheriff's department may be involved in a domain specified by 
a population of organizations doing the same thing and yet may still 
respond to matters which relate to its predisaster domain--although in a 
more limited capacity. In this case, the predisaster domain of 
maintaining social control may or may not be relinquished in the face of
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demands placed on it by a postdisaster domain involving a cluster of 
organizations (Dynes, 1970).
Using the organization as the unit of analysis, Kreps (see, for 
example, Kreps and Bosworth, 1988) speaks of domains in terms of 
environmental niches or "distinct combinations of resources and other 
constraints that are sufficient to support an organization form" 
(Aldrich, 1979:28). After a disaster there are usually distinct tasks 
and goals which need to be addressed. Given the potential immediacy of 
the situation, organizations which cannot meet these goals will be 
replaced by those which can - - and the environment no doubt plays an 
important role in capitulation of these domains (Dynes, 1970).
In sum, it seems that the element Domain has within it two 
analytical distinctions: Domains may specify the boundaries of 
populations of organizations performing the same service, or they may 
delineate a single organization's activities as unique amongst disaster 
related organizations. This distinction, as well as unique 
methodological problems associated with locating domain (D), will be 
given further attention below.
This concludes the section on Kreps' core species notion of 
organization. The movement from activities to domain was deliberate for 
two reasons. First, several reviewers have come to the conclusion that 
the elements, from activities to domain, represent a continuum from the 
concrete to the general; from the empirical to the abstract (e.g.,
Turner (1988), p.167). Kreps (1988) resists such a notion and observes:
[When asked], don't activities, tasks, and domains constitute a 
continuum of increasing generality and inclusiveness that can only 
be distinguished analytically rather than empirically? Our answer 
to the generality part of the question is no. Turner implies that
31
individual actions and perhaps meanings are less abstract and more 
observable than collective representations. We disagree. The 
latter are not just ideas; they are parts of the material culture 
(e.g., as written and verbal communications) that can be recorded 
just as readily as physical behaviors and psychic states. Until 
convinced otherwise, we conclude that all of the elements are 
equally concrete or abstract (p.173).
Secondly, in regards to the Collins' and Wallace's explanation of 
the social construction of structural reality, behavioral regularities 
or recurrent action between individuals (empirically associated with 
activities (A)) account for ever more inclusive levels of social 
structure. Meaning and interdependence are assumed as individuals 
interact (dimensions of tasks and domains), even as they may 
unconsciously create and maintain social structures (such as a societal 
wide division of labor) they do not fully comprehend (Mayhew, 1981). 
While an individual's actions are no doubt meaningful on one level or 
another, the individual as perpetual subject undermines the reality of 
the exterior, prior, and constraining historical social structures into 
which every actor is born and, in many cases, ultimately takes for 
granted. In other words, the entity status of social structure is given 
short shrift. Moreover, purposive behavior or interaction, as an 
explanation for structural creation, maintenance, and change becomes 
extremely cumbersome and ridiculous at ever higher levels of form.
Interactionist commitments also disregard the importance of 
describing the structural characteristics of social forms. Wallace, as 
is pointed out, remains sensitive to structural descriptors by 
separating the physical from the psychical behavioral regularities; in 
other words, social structure may be hierarchically described in terms 
of recurrent behaviors performed by aggregates of individuals which are
circumscribed by time and space. Presumably, psychical behaviors are 
arranged hierarchically as well, and eventually correspond with the 
hierarchy of physical behaviors. However, in his conception of psychical 
behaviors, Wallace winds up with a 6 X 3 table (1983:96) and 18 analytic 
categories. If Wallace is trying to facilitate description, perhaps he 
is moving in the wrong direction. In the last analysis, both Wallace and 
Collins seem to sacrifice descriptive clarity for explanatory 
complexity.
Kreps constructs social structure from "forms of association" 
which reflect, theoretically, the reality of both the individual and 
social unit -- both are subject and object of the social totality.
Entity status of social structure (i.e., organization) is affirmed by 
the demarcation of a threshold of existence; four elements present, an 
organization becomes another player on the social stage. Equally, the 
elements are conceived as representing both physical and psychical 
behaviors. Obviously, both tasks (T) and domains (D) contain a psychical 
componentideas in people's heads”. This subjective element, however, 
is tempered by the requirement that tasks (T) and domains (D) be 
evidenced through written communication. This is further tempered by the 
fact that, as "observers" in the events portrayed in the DRC data, Kreps 
et al. attempt to substantiate the claims made by participants. In this 
sense, as stated above, units have to achieve organization through some 
agreement between participants and observers as to what is going on; 
this is contrary to a more interpretivist approach whereby a 
collectivities' participants are given the benefit of the doubt when it 
comes to bandying about unit symbolizations of purpose.
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METHODS AND ISSUES
As I stated in the introduction, the purpose of this study is to
decipher and describe the impact of different epistemological objectives
upon consequent methodological strategies and outcomes. These various
objectives are captured by three core studies:
Origins: the intent here was to locate instances of emergent 
organization and reconstruct how they came into being. The 
methodology involved first locating an existing, yet nascent, 
organization (evidenced in participant interviews obtained through 
the Disaster Research Center) with the intent of capturing its 
form, taxonomically, through use of the code.
Social Networks: the intent here was to capture and define 
interdependencies or network links between social units. This 
study exploited data from a study earlier conducted by Drabek 
(1981). In Drabek's study, the complete array of network linkages 
between significant organizational players were catalogued through 
the use of blockmodeling techniques. Kreps' networking methodology 
first broke down Drabek's list of organizational participants to 
the level of dyads. The important social networks between member 
units of this dyad were then analyzed and described through use of 
the code.
Restructuring: the intent here was to describe important dynamics 
of organizational restructuring. The methodology focuses on one 
particular organizational unit as that unit responds to nonroutine 
contingencies. The code is then employed to depict and represent 
stages of single restructurings and chains of restructurings by 
the same unit.
What is not apparent from the perfunctory descriptions above are the 
demands placed on the code and researchers by these different units and 
foci of analysis.
To more fully understand these dynamics, the units of analysis, 
foci of analysis and methods, from each of these three studies will be 
detailed. The restructuring study will receive less attention than the
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others. The purpose for its inclusion is to help examine more fully 
where the origins and network studies diverge and intersect. This 
section will conclude by examining the methodological strategy employed 
by this research in light of the following discussion.
Origins
It should be mentioned early on that Kreps' structural code was 
initially devised to search for and identify positively the social form 
known as organization. The theoretical significance of each of the 
elements (and/or combinations of the elements), remains across three 
different research strategies -- at times, however, in slightly altered 
fashion. The important point to be made here is that the origins study 
was first in line. As a result, the network and restructuring studies 
have had to reconcile epistemological commitments made early on (e.g., 
four elements present represents organization) with their own 
distinctive conceptual and empirical imperatives.
As stated above, the objective of the origins study was to observe 
and characterize stages in the creation of an emergent organization -- 
an organization which was not in existence prior to the advent of some 
natural disaster. This initially required finding emergent organization 
through "spadework" with the DRC archives. According to Kreps (and 
Bosworth, 1988), this was done in the following way: "First, direct 
participants or others involved in an emergency generally characterize 
nascent social units by specific names and spheres of activity. This was 
critically important for establishing the existence of emergent 
organizations and what they did (domains)(p.12)."
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Once located, the emergent organization was characterized by the 
code through event depictions, the content of informant accounts. One 
important "advantage" for this study was that these organizations were 
the culmination of processes that were circumscribed by one, and only 
one, "event of organizing" -- namely, the gestation period and birth of 
an organization. (Throughout the rest of this study, an "event" will 
refer to some intersection of time, space, circumstance, and human 
material, the collision of which one may confidently look down on and 
say, "Something is going on down there." --a virtual cauldron of 
potential organization.) This "advantage" derives from the fact that 
these "nascent social units" (and the event of organizing from which 
they arise) are described in terms of overall activity processes. And 
the initial identification of participants, organizational unit or 
individual, is not a critical part of locating these emergent entities.1 
Because of this, analyzing degrees of interdependence between discrete 
participants is not necessarily important to account for overall 
organizational emergence. In sum, what was extremely important in the 
network study, was not particularly consequential for the origins study.
The gist of the observations above can be expressed 
diagrammatically in the following fashion using an emergent organization 
depicted taxonomically as an A-R-D-T form.2 Processes related to the 
formation of this emergent organization are analyzed in order to 
represent three empirically demonstrable structural possibilities. In 
what follows, oex will symbolize the "organizing event" for a nascent 
organization, while EC*! will represent the "emergent organization" as 
culmination of the organizing process. Furthermore, Ix symbolizes an
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observable individual as social actor (I'sN a plurality of actors), 
while 0X represents some identifiable orgnaizational unit.
To proceed with the description of the first structural 
possibility:
Flood waters rise over a period of days in the community and 
are monitored. Flooding eventually covers much of an urban area 
and virtually the entire downtown of its major city. There are few 
deaths or injuries but extensive property damage. Major flood 
conditions prevail for over a week. The police department 
initially is involved in traffic control during the emergency 
period, but that action terminates with the complete inundation of 
central city streets. Several citizens with boats docked in the 
downtown area conjointly begin evacuating people from buildings. 
Their preliminary actions are independent of anything being done 
by the police department. In fact, police official note that, at 
this point, they are looking for something to do.
(1) emergent from individuals or groups of individuals
I' sN—  oej —  - • I2
Here we note the preliminary actions of unaffiliated individuals
(unofficial helpers), who gather in response to some collectively
perceived need. Their actions, while uncoordinated with the actions of
more formal, "official" units, nevertheless, represent the nascent
beginnings of a more encompassing entity --the first observable
installment in this event of organizing. At this point, the evacuation
conducted by these individuals has the potential for organization, but,
as is usually the case, these actions become engaged in a larger effort.
There has been no preplanning for what follows. Having a few boats 
of their own, the police coordinate their evacuation actions with 
those of private citizens (Activities). The need to evacuate the 
entire downtown area quickly becomes apparent. A large number of 
boats from other private owners, the bureau of land management, 
the fire department, and the military are provided. The latter 
public bureaucracies also offer personnel to drive some of the
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boats, and some citizen volunteers respond to the same need. By 
now, the majority of police personnel have become involved because 
they are available, in close proximity, and know where to take 
evacuees (Activities-Resources).
(2) emergent from individuals or groups of individuals and 
organizations
OiI
I'sN oex 02
i3
Now we find that our informal evacuation has been incorporated
into a larger effort spearheaded by the police department with resources
coming in from other organizational units. The event of organizing is
still somewhat "informal" in nature and not yet an organized entity.
This soon changes:
The following morning, local government leaders declare the 
downtown evacuation as the responsibility of the police department 
(Activities-Resources-Domain). This is questioned briefly but then 
accepted by fire department officials and is further legitimated 
by state and military officials. The police then quickly develop a 
rather complex task structure -- one that involves locating, 
notifying, dispatching, and refueling of boats, assigning of 
police personnel to all boats, and coordinating of water and 
ground transportation to move evacuees to shelter (Activities- 
Resources-Domain-Tasks). About 5000 people are evacuated during 
the next 3-4 days. The operation is maintained by the police 
department until the demand is met (Kreps, 1985:10).
(3) emergent from organizations
°4 EOi 02
ti
°3
Finally, at the bequest of local government leaders, the operation 
is taken over by the police department. The event becomes firmly lodged 
in the domain of existing organizational units; and an emergent
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organization arises from the stream of intially informal activities from
which it spawned. Questions of power and legitimation become the concern
of existing units and, in the end, the police department is granted the
commission to dictate how the operation is to be performed.
As it seems, the emergent organization above is most fully
represented by structural possibility two; that is, emergent from some
combination of individual and social units. The important consideration
is that in the origins methodology, the units of analysis are less
important than the focus of the analysis -- who was involved is less
important than what was happening. As Kreps (1988) explains it:
Critical for understanding the approach, the reader must keep in 
mind that even though most (all but 52) of the 423 instances of 
organization found were enacted by established units of various 
types (they existed prior to the event), [their] presence is not 
assumed for purposes of studying the process of organization (p.7; 
emphasis in the original).
Put another way, the overall event of organizing becomes both the focus
of analysis and the unit of analysis.
Social Networks
While ostensibly dealing with origins as well, the objectives for 
the network studies are really quite in contrast to those in the earlier 
study. The network study begins with an somewhat exhaustive list of 
extant organizational units. The intent, consequently, is to observe the 
cluster of associations for one unit in general and its relationship 
with other units, expressed as a dyad, in particular. Right away, one 
clear contrast to the origins study becomes obvious; namely, the units 
of analysis are extremely important and must be specified. Here, the
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question, what may constitute a unit within an organizational dyad, 
becomes paramount. Additionally, by examining "cluster of associations" 
for one unit, the focus of analysis is catapulted from (a) the sphere of 
commitments involving one emergent unit engaged in one event of 
organizing (above), into (b) the realm of overall unit commitments 
represented throughout the entire disaster response.
The following example (Case #0420 from Kreps' origins materials)3 
represents both the dynamics of splintering an emergent organization 
into organizational dyads and the prominence of issues relating to 
distinguishing member units for dyads.
A small town on the Mississippi gulf coast is devastated by 
a hurricane. In the ensuing maelstrom, city buildings and streets 
are inundated with water, thus effectively stifling mobility, and 
lines of communication are severed so that the town is completely 
isolated. For the next two days, civic organizations and residents 
are immobilized thus, stymieing any semblance of organized 
activities. By the third day, a representative of a nearby NASA 
testing facility and resident of the town arrives and offers to 
the mayor key resources including personnel and material resources 
(water, fuel, and some equipment) which were at his disposal 
(Resources). With the influx of these resources, the mayor calls a 
meeting with civic leaders including the CD director, the police 
chief, town aldermen, and a local doctor to discuss ways in which 
these resources should be used. South Central Bell offers a 
meeting site for their emerging Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
and, with the help of the NASA representative, the mayor organizes 
what comes to be called the overall Civil Defense effort 
(Resources-Domain). Over the next few days this group addresses 
various demands dealing with communications, the operations of the 
evacuation shelters, search and rescue, and the assimilation of 
outside assistance into the ongoing effort (Resources-Domain- 
Activities). A task structure emerges from these activities 
whereby responsibilities and distinct areas of interest are 
divided among EOC representatives (Resources-Domain-Activities- 
Tasks).
A schematic representation of the individuals and/or social units 
involved in this emergent EOC might look something like this:
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I1 (mayor)
I
t
I6 (doctor) |  ^l20i (police chief)
I's5' (aldermen) !3°2 (c^ director)
!
IA (NASA rep.)
In this diagram: Ix and I5 represent individuals affiliated with town
government;
120! and I302 represent individuals who embody formal 
organizations;
I4 represents an individual who wields the resources of 
an organization, yet does not embody that 
organization;
I6 represents an individual with no relevant 
affiliations.
As a source of viable organizational dyads for an analysis of 
social networks, this organization, an emergent EOC, contains only one 
possibility -- the relationship between social units represented by the 
police department and Civil Defense:
0]_ (police) <-- > 02 (CD)
What is not apparent from the event depiction is that the police 
department of this small town has only six members, while the Office of 
Civil Defense is staffed by two persons -- both acting in a volunteer 
capacity with outside commitments. Nevertheless, both would be 
considered social units. At the same time, neither the mayor nor the 
aldermen, those representatives of town government, would be considered 
possible member units for an organizational dyad. Moreover, the NASA 
representative does not represent NASA because he was acting in a 
citizen capacity. The relevant question becomes as follows: What may 
constitute a "social unit", as member of an organizational dyad? This
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issue will be taken up again in the following section.
A final point addressing the event portrayed above. As a viable 
dyad, the relationship between the police department and Office of Civil 
Defense did not begin with the EOC. Interestingly, this same dyad was 
the focus of an emergent organization located from the archives for the 
time period immediately preceding the impact of the hurricane. This 
emergent organization, which involved the evacuation activities for the 
small town, was constructed from the joint activities of these same 
social units. Therefore, this dyadic network had a history which spanned 
several organizing events. In the subsequent network methodology both of 
these events would have been analyzed in terms of the overall depth of 
interdependence between the two social units.
In sum, the network methodology has quite specific units of 
analysis. By analyzing organizational or social unit dyads, the first 
requirement, by definition, involves identification of all relevant 
social units -- possible member units for consequent dyadic pairs. This 
requirement is in direct contrast to the origins methodology, whereby 
enacting participants are more or less inconsequential to the event 
drama at large. In addition, since assessing overall degrees of 
interdependence between two social units is the goal for the network 
study, the focus of analysis broadens greatly as the entire cluster of 
associations between the two organizations is observed. Applying the 
code across these diverse events, where organizations and their 
representatives bump into each other across multiple domains and 
eclectic contingencies, many times results in rather interesting 
characterizations of network forms.
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Restructuring
As far as focus of analysis, students of restructuring do not have 
to worry with either locating events of organizing or analyzing entire 
clusters of associations across multiple events. Because the unit of 
analysis is constant, a functioning organization, neither must students 
of restructuring worry about the entity status of social units. In this 
case, an organization is beset by some nonroutine pressures which serve 
as a catalyst to force or compel its members to enact coping measures. 
There is a single unit of analysis, one observable organization, and the 
event is self-contained or circumscribed by this organization as it 
moves from one potentially precarious circumstance to the next.
It could be said, with some degree of confidence, that all 
organizations, disaster relevant or not, undergo some type of 
restructuring if they are impacted by a natural disaster. Moreover, most 
disaster relevant organizations, community based or not, become involved 
in some fashion or another, with other disaster relevant organizations. 
And finally, some of these organizations inexorably find themselves 
caught up in processes yielding an emergent organization. Here, then, we 
find not methodological dissimilarities between the three studies, but, 
rather, conceptual and empirical similarities between the observables 
within community responses to disaster.
These similarities may be communicated diagrammatically. For 
example, for every emergent organization composed of either individuals 
and organizations or solely from extant organizations, we find multiple 
sources for viable dyads:
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I
O4 EOj^ 02
O3
Thus, if an emergent organization is created from event processes 
between four unique organizations, then there are six empirically 
demonstrable dyads:
0 X < - - - >  0 2 Oi < - - - >  0 3 0 X < - - - >  0 4
0 2 <---> 0 3 02 <---> O4
03 < >
Each of the member units within each dyad could then be analyzed in 
terms of restructuring:
01 < > 02 
Rqi or Ro2
It is quite possible that network linkages between two organizations 
would mimic sequences of restructurings for one organization or the 
other. For example, an emergent task structure (T) between 01 and 02 
would be coterminous with a task (T) restructuring for both members of 
the dyad.
Another possibility, which encompasses all three conceptual 
landscapes and players, involves two social units in a dyadic 
relationship. Over the course of processes within this dyad an emergent 
organization is produced which is, in reality, a complete restructuring 
of one member unit.
0} <---> 02 ---> Rq2 : EOi
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It was observations such as these which crystallized the 
methodology implemented in this research. Noting the conceptual 
similarities between the empirical landscapes of the three 
methodologies, it was thought that perhaps by introducing the 
methodology of one study to the unique focus of analysis of another, an 
enlightening partnership would be created. Put more concretely, the 
question was raised: What would be the result if, say, an emergent 
organization from the origins study was analyzed by the social networks 
methodology (with all its special requirements, especially regarding the 
code)? And what would be the outcome if organizational dyads from the 
network study were reanalyzed wearing origins colored glasses?
To answer these questions required a tertiary analysis of Kreps' 
secondary analysis of primary case materials obtained from both the 
Disaster Research Center archives and Drabek et al. (1981). These 
available data, analogous to the materials used in Kreps and Bosworth's 
(1988), are described below:
Drabek's case materials deal with search and rescue 
operations during the emergency periods of five natural disasters 
(three tornadoes, one flood, and one volcanic eruption). His data 
include the following: (1) transcribed summaries of semi- 
structured interviews with organizational officials and unofficial 
helpers that were taped recorded originally during fieldwork at 
the disaster sites; (2) structured surveys which provided 
background data on most of the organizations involved in search 
and rescue operations; (3) newspaper clippings, meeting notes and 
organizational reports; and (4) the final monograph produced from 
the project (p.8).
Case materials from the Disaster Research Center (DRC) deal 
with search and rescue and also a range of other response domains 
(Kreps, 1985) which were enacted during the emergency period of 10 
natural disasters (one earthquake, two hurricanes, three 
tornadoes, and four floods). The DRC archives are largely in the 
form of verbatim transcriptions of unstructured interviews with 
either participants in emergent organizations or other individuals 
who reported on the actions of these social units. A variety of
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related documentary information (newspapers, meeting minutes, 
recorded direct observation, and after-action reports) are 
available for these events as well (p.10).
A purposive sample of 19 cases (see Table 2) was drawn from the 
two data files. The justification for those cases purposively selected 
and analyzed follows from the sensitizing, cross-methodological strategy 
alluded to above. Regarding the analysis of emergent organizations from 
a networking perspective, it was felt that this could best be 
accomplished using 1) the subset of total DRC cases which were 
identified according to Focal Organization Type; that is, in particular, 
emergent organizations coded "7", emergent from organizations; and 2) a 
subset of this subset which were thought, initially, to best represent 
emergent organizations comprised from two distinct and observable social 
units.
From the Drabek data file, cases were selected according to 
number of elements characterizing the social network links between two 
units. Here, the emphasis was not on the units themselves, but on the 
conceptual puzzle dealing with why three element forms of association 
failed to gain a fourth. In other words, with ostensibly similar units 
as the origins studies, and across similar conditions, the network study 
failed to locate a single instance of emergent organization. Therefore, 
a purposive sample of 10 dyads, with three element network forms, was 
selected in order to discern what conceptual outcomes would result had 
these dyads been analyzed by the origins methodology. The implicit 
question asked: For what reasons, empirically, conceptually, or 
methodologically, did these dyads fail to achieve the status of or be 
recognized as emergent organizations?
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TABLE 2: Purposive 
from
Samples 
the Two
of Relevant 
Data Sources
Case Materials
Events Cases Case No. FOT* Form
DRC DATA
1. Flood, Fairbanks, 
Alaska, 1967
1 #0014 7 RDTA
2. Flood, Anchorage, 
Alaska
1 #0033 7 RDTA
3. Tornado, Topeka, 
Kansas, 1966
2 #0172
#0187
7
7
RADT
DRTA
4. Tornado, Belmond 
Iowa, 1966
i #0251 6 DTRA
5. Oak Lawn Tornado, 
Chicago, 111., 1967
2 #0365
#0366
7
1
DRTA
TDRA
6. Hurricane Camille, 2 
Gulf Coast, 1969
Subtotal 9
#0419
#0420
7
6
DRTA
RDAT
DRABEK DATA
7. Tornado, Lake Pomona, 
Kansas, 1978
3 #004
#005
#014
RAT
RTA
TRA
8. Tornado, Wichita Falls, 
Texas, 1979
1 #023 RAT
9. Tornado, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, 1979
2 #055
#060
TRA
RTA
10. Volcanic Eruption, 
Mount St. Helens, 
Washington, 1980
4 #095
#096
#117
#120
TDR
RTD
TDR
RTD
Subtotal 10
Total 19
* Focal Organization Type (FOT). Organizations were coded as to 
whether they were:
1 -- Public Bureaucracies;
6 - - Emergent Groups of Individuals; or
7 - - Emergent Groups of other Groups or Organizations
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Three additional cases were appended later. As this study 
progressed, it was judged that a more complete picture of the dynamics 
of applying Kreps' code would result if instances of organization 
emergent from individuals and as a result of organizational 
restructuring were analyzed (cases #0251, #0420,and #0366).
The empirical and conceptual similarities between the three 
studies, origins, networks and restructuring have been examined above; 
as have the conceptual dissimilarities regarding the focus of analysis 
explicit in each approach. Another commonality between the three 
approaches obviously is Kreps' structural code. It's rather fascinating 
to note that even as the code shapes and distinguishes social forms 
across differing foci of analysis, so, too, do these unique foci of 
analysis affect use and significance of the elements in the code. What 
conceptual and theoretical properties activities (A), resources (R), 
tasks (T), and domain (D) possess are altered subtly as they are applied 
to uniquely divergent phenomena - - and the consequences are varied and 
interesting. A presentation of some of these interesting consequences 
will follow. Other issues of relevance will be addressed in the 
following section such as the eccentricities of establishing viable 
units for consequent dyadic formulations. Additionally, the difference 
between taking a "holistic" approach to an event sequence as opposed to 
either 1) focusing on single dyads within an event sequence or 2) 
focusing on a single dyad across multiple event sequences will be 
explored.
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FINDINGS
Consistent with the previous methods section, the Findings format 
will deal first with issues related to the origins study, moving later 
to a discussion of the social networks study. As before, the 
restructuring methodology will receive perfunctory treatment only when 
it further elucidates key points of disjuncture among the three 
methodologies. The analysis will revolve, once again, around the issues 
of units of analysis and foci of analysis for each methodology.
Sustained attention will be given each dimension, especially as to its 
effect on the application of Kreps' code. At the conclusion of each 
methodological discussion, Kreps' structural code will receive attention 
on its own terms. And a final installment will attempt to summarize and 
bring closure to this analysis.
Origins by Social Networks 
As was stated in the Methods and Issues section, the methodology 
for this study involves the application of one study's methodological 
focus onto the substantive materials and conceptual outcomes of 
"parallel” studies. It is important to remember, however, that the 
research "subject" under observation was always some population's 
response to a natural disaster. With a common subject it might seem that 
the following analysis is but a tripartite snapshot, from three 
different angles, the total result of which is that the object is
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observed in some detail. In fact, this was the case in applying the 
network methodology to origin's case materials. Why? Namely, because the 
origin's study deals with self-contained events of organizing. It 
simplifies the overall response structure between diverse organizations 
and individuals by focusing on only one event. With the stage set, so to 
speak, and emergent organization the theme, players' (organizational 
units and individuals) parts are already defined -- the script is 
approved.
This overall methodological and conceptual process may be 
represented by a series of concentric circles, each of which symbolizes 
some empirical and conceptual aspect of the disaster environment (see 
Figure 1) -- interlocking circles of analytical interest. The movement 
inward presents this environment from its most inclusive level to more 
specific designations. Such a configuration will serve to represent both 
the essence of the origins study, as a working methodology, and the 
place of organizational dyads within it. The outermost circle takes in 
the entire disaster response and defines the researchable subject. 
Through the interviews,observable arenas of action begin to coalesce 
around various events (circle 2). Because individuals are curiously 
bounded by time and space, an event merely serves to provide the 
boundaries of and cognitive backdrop for the actions of these 
individuals as they act, interact, and react to the effect of some 
natural disaster. At some point, the actions of individuals (of various 
affiliations) within this event cross some threshold of "Being" or 
"Becoming" -- observability, viability, and content -- such that they 
achieve entity status as emergent units. Circle 3, therefore, represents
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Figure 1: Symbolic Representation 
of the Origins Methodology
1) DISASTER CONTEXT
2) SOCIAL EVENT 
OF ORGANIZING
3) EMERGENT 
ORGANIZATION
4) SOCIAL NETWORKING 
BY PARTICIPANT UNITS
5) SINGLE 
UNIT 
RESTRUCTURING
51
the recognition of an emergent unit, a possible emergent
organization, which then becomes the unit of analysis for the origins
methodology. Consequently, the evolutionary stages in its development
are reconstructed using Kreps' code.
This emergent organization may also be analyzed in terms of
participating units. Circle 4 represents, then, the analysis of
participant organizations, in terms of dyadic social networks, within
the context of the overall emergent unit. And the innermost circle (5)
speaks to the possibilility of analyzing existing and participating
units in terms of restructuring.
The notion of focusing on participant units is not paramount to
the origins methodology. However, because these dyads are contained
within a single event and are circumscribed by a parent, encompassing
entity, the analysis is fairly straight forward. This same illustration,
using concentric circles, will be used later to show why the analysis of
social networks by the origins methodology is much more problematic.
To illustrate the above conceptualization, an example will be
provided from the case materials involving a tornado which struck a city
in Iowa (case #0251). The following, from Brouillette's (1966) "Summary
of High Points", serves as a sensitizing description which should help
to highlight the notion of multiple events of activity:
Four phases of search and rescue: The first phase started at 2:58 
when the tornado hit and lasted for about a half an hour. Search 
and rescue was not organized, consisted of individuals looking for 
their families and neighbors and relatives. The second phase 
commenced at about a half an hour after the tornado hit. [The] 
Volunteer Fire Department was in the field searching for the dead 
and injured after the tornado hit. The third phase of rescue 
activity started two or three hours after the tornado hit. The 
Iowa Highway Patrol organized groups to search for the dead and 
injured. It consisted mainly of farmers from the area, [city]
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residents not in the impact area, sheriff's department personnel, 
city policemen, etc., in the surrounding area. The fourth phase of 
rescue did not start until the next morning at 8 A.M. in which 
uniformed police, including city police, sheriffs, and highway 
patrol, were organized by [a] county sheriff and the Captain of 
the [Highway] Patrol into 8 or 10 teams, consisting of 8 or 10 men 
each, who systematically searched every building to check for dead 
and injured. Upon successful completion of searching of each 
house, the team captain would tie a tag on the outside of the 
house. The tag would include the time checked, what was found, and 
the team captain's signature.
Four phases of search and rescue and/or possible events of organizing
are thus identified. The search and rescue operation during the last
phase crosses the threshold of "Being” and "Becomes" the unit of
analysis as an emergent organization.
Before the description of and event depiction for this emergent
organization is presented, the following should be kept in mind. In
keeping with the illustration using the concentric circles, the origins
methodology distills single events and resultant units from the overall
disaster response. In doing so, the disaster's complex impact upon the
entire realm of social units and individuals is rendered manageable.
Additionally, by focusing on only one event and the emergent form which
comes to symbolize the structure of that event, applying the structural
code is also facilitated. The reconstruction of origins for the emergent
unit, the entity status of which is pre-established, becomes a matter of
locating structural elements which are already presumed to exist. The
important questions regarding application of the code become: When did
the emergent unit gain external legitimation? When did the emergent unit
evidence an internal division of labor? When were resources acquired or
necessary for the emergence of the unit? When were activities pursued or
enacted relative to the proposed raison d'etre for the emergent unit?
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The code is thus employed, not in terms of the complex relations between
either social units, the individuals who represent these social units,
or discrete, unaffiliated individuals, but, rather, to characterize form
from the content of an overriding event sequence.
Returning to the Iowa scenario from above (case #0251), the
reconstruction of the stages in this emergent unit's origins, its form
at origins, was judged to be D-T-R-A. The event sequence of this
organization's emergence is as follows:
After the conclusion of the third phase of search and rescue (due 
to darkness), it was jointly decided and agreed to by the Captain 
of the Highway Patrol and the Sheriff of •'Proximity" county that 
one more systematic, organization search would be prudent. There 
was some initial conflict over who was to be in charge, however,
this was quickly resolved in favor of joint control (Domain).
During the night meetings were held focusing on how best to 
conduct this last search. It was decided that a house to house
search would be conducted by teams of patrolmen and sheriff's. To
facilitate the comprehensive nature of the search, tags would be 
placed on the front and back doors stating when it had been 
searched and by whom (Domain-Tasks). These tags were secured as 
were the human material necessary to conduct this search (Domain- 
Tasks-Resources). At six o'clock the next morning, a meeting was 
convened which was attended by highway patrolmen, sheriffs and 
deputy sheriffs from surrounding counties, and police from the 
impacted city as well as other nearby towns. During this meeting 
the plan was laid out, search teams of officers were established, 
and soon afterward, the search was conducted accordingly. The 
final phase of search and rescue took only two hours to complete 
during which time some additional victims were located (Domain- 
Tasks-Resources-Activities).
Here we have one event centered around an emergent search and 
rescue effort. "Search and rescue" becomes the domain of the event, and 
presumably the domain for all organizations and individuals involved. If 
our aim was to analyze this emergent organization in terms of social 
networks, then the relationship between the Highway Patrol Department 
and the "Proximity" County Sheriff's Office would stand out as our focal
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dyad. Analyzing the social networking between these two organizations,
and characterizing this network through the code, would proceed on the
basis of our dyads participation in the search and rescue venture.
Wherever or however else these organizations may have been involved
throughout the total disaster context is disregarded in favor of an
expedited search for social networks or interdependencies in regards to
this one event.
A similar example can be found in the dyadic relationship
involving a City Building and Zoning Department from a Midwestern city
and a Building Inspectors Associations serving the area (case #0365).
The event depiction is as follows:
The tornado which struck the city on Friday morning carved a three 
and a half mile long avenue of destruction. Hundreds of homes and 
other family dwellings were either destroyed outright or sustained 
major structural damage. Recognizing the potential danger of these 
unsafe structures for the inhabitants and knowing that many of 
these buildings would have to be condemned, the mayor and other 
city officials turned this issue over to the city Building and 
Zoning Department. The mayor on Friday evening was quoted as 
saying to the city Building Commissioner, "Do what you have to do, 
whatever you have to do. If somebody gets in your way', run them 
over, and if he gets up, I'm gonna run you over." The city 
Building Commissioner, knowing that he and his staff of four could 
not even begin to effectively inspect the all the damaged 
buildings, decided to enlist the aid of the South Suburban 
Building Officials Association (SBLC). As the only individual 
legally empowered to condemn buildings and realizing the city 
would soon be flooded with private contractors and insurance 
claims adjustors, the Building Commissioner prepared to take 
charge of what would become an extensive operation (Domain). An 
agreement with members of the SBLC as a result of a previous 
tornado, expedited the arrival of volunteer support -- building 
commissioners and inspectors, from surrounding areas, began to 
arrive the following morning (Domain-Resources). As the man in 
charge, the building commissioner, made several immediate 
decisions. First, to protect these "volunteers" from any legal 
repercussions, they were "hired", on the spot for one dollar each 
and each man was assigned official appointment cards. These 
"employees" were then divided into teams each led by an inspector 
handpicked by the Building Commissioner. Teams were then assigned 
to certain impacted areas and told to "fan out" in order to cover
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all of the impacted area. Buildings were categorized as belonging 
to one of 3 classes: a) light (or habitable buildings), b) 
moderate to heavy (buildings with apparent structural damage but 
still habitable in a crunch), and c) heavy to severe (buildings 
which were structurally unsound and uninhabitable)(Domain- 
Resources-Tasks). Three separate inspections occurred over the 
next few days until all those buildings which could not be 
salvaged were condemned and eventually destroyed (Domain- 
Resources-Tasks-Activities).
Aside from the questions relating to the designation of organizational
units (e.g., is an association an organizational unit?), again, we find
a possible dyadic relationship between organizations where that
relationship is circumscribed by one event.
This case example also delineates the continuities and
discontinuities between the conceptual peculiarities of the origins,
social networks and restructuring methodologies. It must first be
affirmed that an emergent entity is generated --an organized entity
which was not present before the disaster. However, regarding the
participants, how best is this emergent organization analyzed? Two
important points, one from the interview data, may help answer this
question. First, we note the fact that the Building Commissioner, and
his employees, were also a members of the SBLC -- i.e., even though
there are two distinct organizational entities, these entities are
nonetheless linked by joint membership. Secondly, from a conceptual
perspective, we observe that the domain of these two entities did not
change in response to the disaster. The inspection of buildings was
their game before and after, the tornado.
Since the domain of the Building and Zoning Department did not
change, and thus the activities were an extension of predisaster
activities, are we "merely" dealing with an organization which had to
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expand or extend its structure and process to accomplish the task at 
hand?4 In other words, is this episode actually an example of 
restructuring of an existing organization, prompted by a disaster 
catalyst and altered by an influx of human resources? Or should this 
episode more rightly be construed as the culmination of social 
networking processes, processes which antedate the disaster?
In a later episode (Case #0366), involved in this same disaster 
scenario, we find the Building Commissioner, representing either the 
emergent organization or his predisaster status, requesting the city 
fire department to perform a function quite distinct from their 
predisaster domain. In this event sequence, the fire department is asked 
to expedite the demolition of condemned buildings by a systematic 
evacuation and burning of each building. In this case, obviously the 
fire department is undergoing a radical restructuring, especially in 
regards to its domain. However, are not there also elements of social 
networking involved? And what of an emergent organizational entity 
encapsulating both the condemnation of buildings by the Building 
Commissioner and the removal of these buildings by the fire department?
It is here that we confront the first instance of multiple and 
connected events involving two or more organizations. Depending on the 
scope of one's holistic view of the disaster activity, event portrayals 
may change drastically or in more subtle ways. The origins method takes 
on the entire disaster response one event at a time. The social 
networking and restructuring methodologies follow focal units over 
indefinite periods of time and across many and unique events.
Furthermore, while the origins study does in fact uncover instances of
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organization where they did not exist previously, many times this 
designation of "organization" is not synonymous with "entity". It may 
merely describe and embody the essence of the observed activities. The 
actual entity may more closely be represented by a restructuring 
organization or a social network.
Organized States and Activities
One other observation, this time related to the conceptual 
significance of patterns of the elements, should be made. Regarding the 
two events or organizing depictions above (cases #0251 and #0365), the 
reader may note the initial appearance, in various sequences, of the 
elements domain (D), tasks (T), and resources (R). For example, 
regarding the social network involving the Highway Patrol and the 
"Proximity" County Sheriff's Department (case #0251), the reader will 
note that it was this dyad which secured the first three elements (D-T- 
R). And this much prior to the enactment of activities (A) -- the 
remaining element for organization to exist.
Empirically, it is interesting to note that during the night 
preceding the actual search and rescue, actions occurring between the 
individuals representing the Highway Patrol and the Sheriff's Department 
appear to have manufactured an organized state. And not until search and 
rescue operations commenced, that is, only after activities (A) related 
to the emergent domain (D) and task structure (T) ensued, did this 
organized state cross the threshold to organization. The same example 
could be made from the Midwestern building inspector's operation (case 
#0365).
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It might be asked, what of the actions between these individuals 
which created such a state of near organization? Are these actions 
important to the event of organizing, and if they are, how should they 
be viewed? Are these actions not activities (A) in the same sense as 
actions related to search and rescue? For the origins methodology, these 
questions are not of paramount importance. Activities (A) relate to the 
overall event of organizing. Therefore, rather than make an issue of 
actions between participants, this approach simply asks, did the 
emerging organization enact activities (A) relevant to its professed 
domain (search and rescue)?
We might even go so far as stating that activities (A), in the 
origin's study correspond with the notion of actions which actually "do” 
something -- e.g., searching houses, driving ambulances, pulling bodies 
from the wreckage. There is no corresponding distinction made for those 
actions between individuals who are actually involved in planning, 
coordinating or controlling the course of the emergent effort. In this 
sense, we seem to have a dichotomy between what may be termed "white- 
collar" activities, or activities related to organizing which do not 
actually "do" anything, and "blue-collar" activities or activities which 
do not relate to organizing, but which actually "do" something.
The important point to be made here is that activities (A) 
recapitulate the nature of the overall event of organizing -- i.e., for 
what reason did the emergent organization come into being and did it 
conduct activities related to this purpose? Methodologically, then, in 
terms of applying the elements, if activities (A) follow the designation 
of either domain (D) or task (T) then ensuing actions are focused and
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defined by either: 1) the domain of the event (the principal sphere of 
activities defining the event) or 2) the structure of the division of 
labor. Regarding Domain-Activities, the relevant question becomes: Were 
actions undertaken which conformed to the professed domain (D) or did 
the- emerging organization do what it set out to do? Regarding Tasks- 
Activities, the important question is: Did the organization do what it 
set out to do, according to the explicit or implicit task structure?5
Still regarding the conceptual notion of an "organized state" 
which must "wait" for activities (A) to ensue before emergence is
complete, we note the obverse of such a scenario as the situation where
the domain (D), external legitimation for an emerging organization, is 
problematic or not forthcoming. In this case, three elements, tasks (T),
resources (R) and activities (A) may be noted in an event sequence, but
the unit, as emergent entity or social network, is cannot be afforded 
entity status because, as yet, there is no external legitimation. 
Nevertheless, T-A or A-T (or in some way combined with resources (R)), 
provided this configuration corresponds to a singular event, could be 
said to represent not an "organized state", but "organized activity"
(see Figure 2). Here activities (A) are defined and patterned by virtue 
of a division of labor and are, in a sense, "organized". There are many 
examples of this phenomenon in the social networking case materials.
Another important aspect, relative to the origins methodology, 
deals with the temporal aspect of organizing -- especially in regards to 
any organizational form composed initially of domain (D), tasks (T), and 
resources (R) --in whatever order. For example, the D-R-T pattern at 
origins for the building inspector's operation (the emergent
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Figure 2: The Relationship Between 
Organized States, Activities, and Entities
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organization cited in case #0365) deals with a relatively short period 
of time in relation to the total life span of this organization -- that 
being, approximately one week. The activities (A) which completed the 
requirement for organization, essentially, then, could be viewed as 
"covering" the extent of that week's activities.
This observation warrants two further points: 1) In the origins 
methodology, every attempt is made to reconstruct the origins of an 
emergent organization in terms of a logical evolutionary pattern; that 
is, temporal continuity between the elements is of utmost importance. 
Furthermore, 2) whether the actual origins process takes four hours or 
four days, the methodological end result is supposed to yield a 
taxonomic portrait of some emergent entity. The conceptual importance of 
"entity" status should not be taken lightly. For instance, if an overall 
unit (composed of organizations or individuals) indeed achieves the same 
entity status as pre-existent organizations, then this emergent 
organization assumes a place in the environment of other organizations. 
It may then be analyzed in terms of dyadic (triadic and so on) social 
networks or in terms of organizational restructuring.
A truly fascinating example of the emergence of a viable and 
important new entity on the scene occurred in Alaska during an 
especially troublesome flood (case #0014). Here, individuals heralding 
from various organizations instigated a program called Kid-E-Vac, which 
evacuated children by plane from Anchorage to Fairbanks. These children 
were not necessarily in danger, but the program served to remove the 
burden of child care from families whose homes or businesses were 
destroyed. The origins sequence for Kid-E-Vac took a little over two
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days (R-D-T), while the program was solvent for over a month (A). During 
this month, there are myriad examples of other organizations responding 
to and affirming Kid-E-Vac's mission and equally numerous examples of 
Kid-E-Vac having to respond to other organization's dictates -- evidence 
of emergent social networks and single organizational restructuring, 
respectively.
To recapitulate the crux of the issues above:
a.) The origins methodological approach distills the complex 
array of intersecting events and social networks down to one 
overall event.
b.) From this event, a unit (composed of various 
participants) is flushed out as having unambiguously passed 
a threshold of "Being".
c.) The stages in this emergent unit's origins are then 
reconstructed yielding both an evolutionary depiction of an 
emergent unit, and yet one more organizational entity among 
a population of extant organizations.
d.) If the overall event and resultant emergent unit remain 
the focus of analysis, then analyzing organizational dyads 
"lifted" from this scenario should not be problematic. 
Furthermore, if an emergent organization is located that is 
a result of some dyadic social network, then the unit of 
analysis is identical for either study. Should this dyad, 
analyzed in terms of the social network's use of the code, 
not yield organization, then it may only be assumed that 
this anomaly is to be explained by divergent uses of the 
code by the two methodologies.
Origins and the Application of the Code
Threshold criteria for applying the elements of the code are 
structured by the focus and units of analysis employed in any given 
study. In the origins study, methodological decisions regarding the code 
are based specifically on event processes, and applied according to the 
evident organizing character of an emergent unit. Because this emergent
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unit has already crossed a threshold of "being", processes between 
discrete individuals and/or organizations are not at issue. Thus, 
threshold criteria regarding the presence or absence of the elements are 
based on their perspective conceptual and theoretical properties alone. 
The network methodology, as will be shown, must implement thresholds for 
the elements which mirror, yet also in some ways transcend the 
theoretical properties of each element. In this section, the application 
of the code by the restructuring study will also be included; namely due 
to the close conceptual relationship between the origins approach and 
restructuring.
Domain
As an elemental stage in origins, domain (D) incorporates several 
important distinctions. By definition, domain (D) symbolizes external 
recognition of and legitimacy for an emergent unit and what it is doing. 
On the surface, this definition seems to apply to one overriding 
phenomenon -- the external legitimation of some emergent entity.
However, there are additional dynamics and properties to this 
designation, not necessarily covered by the generic formulation. For 
instance, on one level, we know that domain (D) is applied in accordance 
with the activities of some unit. These activities can be amalgamated by 
categories which describe specifiable spheres of activities -- i.e., 
legitimation is granted by virtue of the domain of the unit. The 
application of domain (D), then, in this case, identifies some entity 
from content of its activities (A).
Domain
domain <- activities
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On another level, domain (D) confronts both the issue of entity status 
for emergent units and the notion of structural hierarchies. Both of 
these issues will be discussed below.
In reality, external legitimation usually comes on the heels of 
the recognition that a unit is (or will be) performing a service, 
function, whatever, which is considered of some importance relative to 
the community's "needs". Distinct spheres of these relevant activities 
(domains), may denote both distinct populations of units (e.g., law 
enforcement agencies, fire departments) or unique units such as KID-E- 
VAC. In either case, the relationship of domain (D), domain, and 
activities is such that only certain types of activities are recognized 
as cogent domains, and only these domains or activities would seem to be 
legitimated by external sources. An analogy was drawn previously 
representing a dichotomy between "white-collar" activities and "blue- 
collar" activities -- "blue-collar" activities symbolize important 
domains, and provide the observer with the necessary information to 
decide what a unit is doing; "white-collar" activities do not 
necessarily define what the unit is doing, but they are a critical 
component of organizing. An interesting point here corresponds to the 
situation where domain (D) legitimation comes early for an emergent unit 
(first or second element in origins). Legitimation, in other words, is 
granted a unit before the actual execution of unit related activities.
In this sense, while "white-collar" activities are almost never 
considered activities (A) and may not correspond with any cogent domain 
type, they most certainly have a lot to do with external legitimation.
A second contingency related to the methodological recognition of
domain (D) concerns both the type or kind of activities and the 
relationship of participants within the emergent unit to these 
activities. Regarding types of activities, another dichotomy was 
provided by one interviewee: some things can be done by any "Joe” off 
the street, while other areas require a certain amount of expertise. In 
an example above (case #0365), involving the Building Inspector (the 
interviewee), we find an activity type, the inspection of damaged 
buildings, which hot anyone could accomplish with any degree of 
confidence. As the external source of legitimation, the mayor tells the 
building inspector to "do what you gotta do to get the job done". At 
this point, there is no emergent unit in existence to be legitimated; 
therefore, we could be looking at a reaffirmation of legitimation (for 
an existing branch of city government) which was never lost. Other 
domains of activity, such as search and rescue, do not immediately begin 
with legitimation, thus the autonomy and organizational viability of 
this operation is up for grabs.
This also points to the importance of the relationship between an 
organization's pre- and post-disaster activity spheres (or domains), as 
this impacts both the emergent unit and the conceptual significance of 
domain (D). In Case #0187, two newspaper publishers, from different 
cities, are viewed as comprising an emergent organization (D-R-T-A) 
after one publishing house was shut down due to the malevolent presence 
of a tornado. From this example, no source of legitimation external to 
this dyad was given. It could be said none was needed. The newspaper 
publishers were not attempting to inhabit some unique domain, they were 
doing what newspaper publishers do -- publishing a newspaper. Here
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again, we find a monopoly of expertise or function, the activity of 
which does not seem to need any external source of legitimation to 
continue.
Another example of event activities to which domain (D) is 
applied, not necessarily related to the above points, involves Case 
#0251 (i.e., the Iowa search and rescue operation noted above). Domain 
(D) was established by virtue of the fact that the scuffling for 
authority of this operation (between the Highway Patrol and the 
Sheriff's Office) was resolved in favor of joint authority -- i.e., the 
operation's legitimacy was questionable up until the time the authority 
structure was solidified. A further example of domain (D) use comes from 
the restructuring methodology, where one organizational unit is the 
object of inquiry. For this use, domain (D) is in evidence if and when 
that unit changes its domain (dominant sphere of activities) as a result 
of some compelling catalyst.
This brings us to the significance of domain (D) in establishing 
entity status for emergent units. There are multiple examples, two noted 
above, where external legitimation is granted prior to the formation of 
an emergent unit. It is here that the intriguing interplay between 
activities and domains of existing organization and the methodological 
outcomes of applying domain (D) comes into play. For example, in the 
case involving the newspaper publishers, no new entity was legitimated. 
And as regards the legitimation of organizational activities, there was 
never any conflict or question that these organizations were legitimated 
in what they were doing. The questionable nature or, indeed, need for 
domain (D) here, may merely represent the prospect of shifting the focus
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from origins to restructuring -- i.e., how did these two newspaper 
publishers restructure to deal with disaster demands. For the Illinois 
example (case #0365), however we might want to question the necessity of 
external legitimation for an existing branch of city government, the 
constituent units of this encompassing emergent unit (the Building and 
Zoning Office and the Building Inspectors Association) did merge to form 
an entity which was not there prior to the tornado. This legitimation 
occurred while the emergent unit, which appeared later on, was still 
just a gleam in the Building Commissioner's eye. And while these 
organizational units were obviously in the process of restructuring, 
they also restructured in such a way that a new, unique entity hit the 
stage.
So what does this say about the conceptual outcomes of the 
methodological application of domain (D)? It seems to say that not every 
case where domain (D) is documented is representative of the same 
phenomenon. In sum, while the origins methodology, concentrates on 
domain (D) legitimation for the event in toto, by focusing on 
participants within that event and their relationship to observable 
activities (i.e., by fine tuning the focus on content), one may bring 
into question the necessity or legitimacy of domain (D) for some units. 
Furthermore, entity status for emergent units is not uniformly 
represented by either the methodological notation of domain (D) or 
empirical realities. As a process in the stages of organization, the 
significance of domain (D) cannot be ignored; however, as a generic 
descriptor of form, describing the content of myriad, unique organizing 
sequences, domain (D) conceptually seems to flit between the notion of
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external legitimation (for activities or units) and an objective 
criterion for entity status.
Tasks
In regarding task (T), the question for the origins methodology 
is: did the event sequence or emergent unit within this sequence 
evidence a division of labor which facilitated its activities? Unique or 
portentous phenomena regarding the logistics of this task structures 
creation (who created it and who implemented it) are unimportant to this 
designation. Tasks (T), like domain (D), does not uniformly describe 
some empirical reality. Depending on event circumstances, a task 
structure (T) may relate either to the working out of a chain of command 
(i.e., an emergent authority structure) or the working out of patterns 
of performance (i.e., an emergent activity structure).
In the restructuring methodology, a change in task (T) usually 
denotes some change in patterns of activities -- however significant or 
otherwise this change may be. Moreover, the observation of a change in 
tasks (T), for existing organizational units, does not necessarily mean 
that a complete reconstitution of the prevailing division of labor has 
occurred. For this reason, tasks (T), as applied by the restructuring 
methodology, more often than not, corresponds to a change in some 
subsystem of activities within the context of the overall organizational 
division of labor (predominant authority and activity structures). 
Resource
As the origins methodology describes the emergence of some budding 
entity, resource (R), in this case, does not always imply a transfer 
from one unit to another. The important phrase here is "key resources at
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origins"; that is, resource (R) applies to the crucial influx of some 
resource for a burgeoning disaster relevant effort. When resource (R) 
begins the origins sequence, what we usually find is that some physical 
resource (e.g., a building) or ongoing activities, become the 
centerpiece for the emergent unit whose origin is to be analyzed. This 
resource (R) does not have to be offered, it is, in a manner of 
speaking, coopted by the emergent unit. For example, Kid-E-Vac (from 
case #0014) was initiated through and enabled by the ongoing evacuation 
efforts conducted by the Air National Guard. On the flip side, like 
activities (A), if resources (R) follows either domain (D) or task (T), 
then its import is defined and shaped by the dictates of either the 
realization of the predominant sphere of activities or an emergent 
division of labor.
Resources (R), nonetheless, are significant in the origins 
methodology in that they do not "merely" imply a social network, but the 
possibility of an emergent unit. This is quite a different formulation 
from the restructuring or networking methodologies for which resource 
(R) specifies a transfer of human or nonhuman material from one 
established unit to another
-- to be used in some unspecified fashion. It is also different in that, 
contrary to the network and restructuring methods, one and only one 
occasion of resources (R) is important.
This point, however, does not lessen the element's sometimes "grab 
bag" quality. With such a broad range of possible "things" that can be 
considered resources (R), the "problem" is finding just where their 
appearance is most beneficial or significant to the emergent
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organization. For this reason, while its relative significance for 
organization is undeniable, organization, as a taxonomic construct, will 
seemingly never suffer for lack of resources (R).
Activities
The origins methodological treatment of activities (A) has been 
given sustained attention in the section above.
The specification of a change of activities (A), for the 
restructuring methodology, incorporates a wide variety of organizational 
actions. While the methodological criteria for documenting a change in 
activities are not stated explicitly, some "catalyst”, in all cases, 
precipitates this designation. Given the broad interpretation here, most 
instances of organizational restructuring involve some change in the 
pattern, types, or nature of organizational activity.
Overall, the restructuring methodology implements the least 
demanding criteria for application of the code. Restructuring, as a 
process, corresponds to self-contained organizational unit processes 
and, therefore, potential involvement within an emergent organization 
and/or social networks within a population of organizations are not at 
issue. For this reason, for instance, restructuring of domain (D) is 
more in line with a change in domain -- that is, the taking on of 
functions not related to predisaster activities -- and, hence, external 
legitimation is not necessarily a prerequisite. And activities (A) 
relate to everything the organization does in response to either some 
catalyst, a change in domain (D), an altered task structure (T), or some 
infusion of resources (R) -- whichever the case may be.
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Social Networks by Origins
Most social networks analyzed by the corresponding study did not
culminate in or constitute "organization" -- this even though all
organizations emerge from social networks of persons and other social
units (Kreps and Bosworth, 1988:3). It is only through a holistic
approach to social phenomena, that is, as Warriner (1988) points out, by
viewing social structure in terms of constituent systemic processes,
that social networks are understood as important building blocks of more
inclusive forms. In this vein, social networks between individuals and
social units are seen as fulfilling necessary and interdependent roles
for the viability of the whole. In the social network study, the
conception and methodology employed by Kreps et al. excludes the
holistic approach; i.e., that approach which identifies encompassing
systems or units before analysis (re the origins study).
The intent rather is to pin down types and degrees of
interdependence established by social units as they attempt,
hypothetically, to reconstitute "systems" damaged by disaster effects.
According to Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988), a preliminary measure of
interdependence is as follows: the greater the number of elements
present in a social network, the greater the evidence of organization in
progress. Once again, however, it needs to be stressed that in the
social network study, systems or emergent units are not acknowledged
prior to analysis. The impetus for this decision is based, in part, on
Thompson's formulation of interdependence:
Thompson argues that pooled interdependence is its most basic 
form, lest there be no organization at all. Here discrete 
components of a more encompassing entity--e.g., separate branches 
of a large corporation--depend on and contribute to the viability
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of the whole, but their interdependence involves neither the 
movement of resources nor the direct flow of communication between 
them. If neither component is dependent on or supports the other 
in any direct way, how can this structural form be pinned down as 
unique from all others. I suspect it cannot with Thompson's 
approach because he assumes the existence of organization (for me 
the co-presence of domains, tasks, resources, and activities) 
before specifying possible types of interdependence (Kreps and 
Bosworth, 1988:8).
Another reviewer might state, it is precisely because Thompson assumes
organization that he is able to speak of pooled interdependence. In
other words, when one inquires of kinds and degrees of interdependence,
the question seems to be interdependence of individuals or social units
in relation to what? The "what” in the network study, is undefined and
so the analysis proceeds on the basis an exhaustive list of
organizational participants which are then paired to thus represent all
possible social networks gleaned from the entire disaster response
environment.
From the origins section above, we note that analyzing social 
networks, in terms of emergent organizational units - - that is, once the 
event and the emergent unit are given - - is not particularly unique nor 
difficult. However, the network study employs a methodology which 
radically changes the conceptual and empirical environment of 
organizational dyads. The "unit" is no longer a predefined emergent 
entity, but one of many existing organizations which are involved in 
multiple social networks. The role of individuals in regards to these 
organizational units is now necessarily important. And, furthermore, 
social networking between organizational units is no longer 
circumscribed by one event but by the total disaster response.
Using the same illustration of interlocking spheres of analytical
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interest, we find in the network study that the outermost circle does 
not begin with events, but with one particular organizational dyad. This 
dyad is then analyzed across events -- circles 2 and 3. Sometimes these 
events in which our dyad participates are discrete; that is, they occur 
across divergent time periods. Our dyad, for example, may be involved, 
initially, in a predisaster contingency plan; after the disaster, in a 
conjoint search and rescue venture; and sometime later in some organized 
effort to care for victims, rebuild the community, and so on. This would 
constitute a temporal evolution of network commitments. A clear cut 
temporal sequence between events is sometimes difficult to ascertain. 
Member units may be conjointly involved in multiple events which occur 
at nearly the same time. In this case, individuals representing both our 
organizational units, interact in divergent spheres of event activity.
As in the origins perspective, these events exhibit properties which can 
be described on their own terms. In this way, there may be instances 
where separate events, involving event processes between the individual 
representatives from our dyad, may overlap; in this way, yielding 
additional networking dynamics -- circles 4 and 5. Circle 6 symbolizes 
the fact that the organizational dyad is analyzed in terms of the 
overall network of disaster responses.
A case example will be provided below to help illustrate 
the points made above and also explain the significance of employing a 
dyad as unit of analysis rather than an emergent unit from one 
encompassing event. Prior to this event description, however, this 
analysis will address issues critical for the network methodology such 
as: What constitutes an organizational unit (or dyad member)? How do the
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actions and positions of individuals with an organization affect the
analysis? What are the consequences of dealing with multiple events? And
what of emergent organization?
Additionally, regarding use of the code to characterize the social
networks between units, since dyadic relationships are now the unit of
analysis, analytical questions regarding application of the code are
altered: The questions originally prefaced by, "did the emergent
unit. . . now ask:
Does the social network involve conjoined action (Activities)?
Does the social network evidence a mobilization of human and 
material resources (Resources)? Does the social network have a 
division of labor that is agreed to by member units (Tasks)? Are 
the units identified and legitimated externally as parts of a more 
inclusive entity (Domains)? (Kreps, 1988b:3)
First, however, we should address issues which are the conceptual
"stepping stones" for the network study.
Organizational Units
As the unit of analysis is now organizational dyads, how are 
member units for possible dyadic networks selected? For the network 
study, a list of organizational units was provided though Drabek's 
research. These organizations were mainly public or private 
bureaucracies, which spanned the continuum from local to federal
jurisdictions. Still the question remains: What types of entities may
constitute organizational units? Is the criterion one of size,
formalization, relevancy, or convention? Depending on the size of the
impacted community or the relative impact magnitude of the disaster, the 
analysis will deal with potential organizational units which display
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varying degrees of formalization, size and importance -- e.g., the 
tremendous devastation of the hurricane which struck the small coastal 
town in Mississippi (case #0420), impacted relatively small and somewhat 
informal units, while the eruption of Mount Saint Helens, even though 
distant from heavily populated areas, enlisted the aid of organizational 
units ranging from county sheriff's offices to the 6th Army.
What empirical properties must be in evidence for an organization, 
the thing, to be pronounced unambiguously there? If the criteria were 
sheer numbers of paid organizational employees, say, three or more, 
then, from Drabek's study we would lose many of the Civil Defense 
Departments, the Risk Management Departments, some volunteer fire 
departments, and many private voluntary associations. What if the 
criteria were sheer numbers of participants overall -- again, three or 
more? This may enlighten us as far as an objective, empirical criterion 
for organizational units in general -- i.e., the greater the numbers of 
organizational members, the greater the likelihood of high degrees of 
formalization and recognition within a population of organization. This 
criterion, nevertheless, may identify units overall, which never had 
more than a tangential role in the encompassing disaster response. Even 
though an organization may have thousands of members state-wide, only 
two may have actually been involved. Size, in other words, remains a 
contextually bounded criterion. And, finally, what about an 
organization's degree of formalization as a criterion for unit status? 
Again, many units from Drabek's list wouldn't pass even the most nominal 
threshold of formalization.
Regarding organizations, as entities, and distilling properties
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from Kreps' code, we may say that these entities possess and implement 
some specifiable division of labor which delineates power and 
performance between members. An organization can be acted upon and/or 
reacted to. In this environmental vein, it processes inputs and 
manufactures outputs in (and of) one fashion or another. Maybe the key 
to ascertaining viable organizational units for analysis, in any 
disaster context, revolves around 1) entities which do something 
relative to the disaster demands, and 2) entities which are acted upon 
and reacted to -- in other words, entities which are recognized by 
participants as contributing to or facilitating postdisaster activities. 
This would seem to be very close to a criteria of "naming"; i.e., 
organizational units are there because participants specify them by name 
and by what they did.
These criteria would seem to represent rather ephemeral 
distinctions; however, distinctive disasters befalling communities of 
various sizes will elicit the response of quite a range of 
organizations. Small impacted communities will response with small units 
who may otherwise not cross any empirical threshold of power, size, or 
formalization. So in this sense the criteria are sound. On another 
front, in spite of the above, the criteria biases interpretation in 
favor of traditional distinctions of organizational entities. In other 
words, certain city, county, state and federal agencies or 
bureaucracies, such as police and fire departments, highway patrol and 
national guard will always constitute organizations, regardless of 
involvement. Equally, private bureaucracies are seldom viewed as 
anything other than organizations. But what about relatively unknown
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voluntary associations and groups? What of city councils and boards of 
aldermen? Many times constituent units of city government are elicited 
as organizational units (e.g., public works and traffic), while certain 
other very important positions within a city's governmental structure, 
such as the mayor's office or the attorney's office, are not. The irony, 
here, of course, is that even as the origins and network studies analyze 
"organization", the thing and process, deciding what entities should be 
involved in the analysis remains somewhat obscure. The question of 
organizational units, which cries out for some type of threshold 
criteria, continues to be circumstantial and contextually bound.
Organizational Units and Individuals
In general, the larger the size of organizations, the less aware 
we become about the extent of individual member's activities or 
organizational involvement. In this regard, through the interviews one 
never becomes fully cognizant of the actions of all the members of any 
organizational unit; and it really isn't imperative that we know. 
Nevertheless, if we are concentrating on social networks among 
organizations, it is important to know something of where and how 
organizational members are interacting. It still might be wondered: What 
is the conceptual importance of the individual to the organizational 
unit? If members are specified, don't their actions correspond in exact 
terms to organizational actions? The answer is yes and no.
Analyzing an individual's relationship to an organizational unit 
is important for several reasons. At least on one level, it is true 
that: 1) many times individuals may have organizational affiliations and
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yet their disaster-relevant actions are not construed validly as 
"organizational actions"; 2) individuals may have similar organizational 
affiliations and yet not possess the same authority ranking or power 
within that organization; and 3) organizational members are oftentimes 
scattered across the disaster playing field; relative degrees of power 
may influence their impact on the overall social network between 
organizations.
First, it seems we should confront the issue which asks: When are 
an individual's activities synonymous with organizational activities? It 
should not be assumed that the actions of individuals always correspond 
to and should be associated with the organization with which they are 
affiliated. There are multiple examples which have shown this to be a 
premature conclusion. For example, referring back to the Mississippi 
town and its emergent EOC (case #0420), we find the head of the nearby 
NASA testing facility, whose actions are not synonymous with NASA as an 
organizational unit.
There are at least three possibilities describing the relatedness 
of individual action and organizational action: 1) no relation -- 
discrete individuals have no organizational affiliations relevant to 
their actions; 2) related by association -- individuals are associated 
with organizations (may even wield resources from that organization), 
but their actions are nevertheless considered as distinct from their 
parent organization; and 3) interrelatedness -- individuals who 
represent organizational units such that their actions are synonymous 
with organizational actions.
Because we are dealing with two "entities", the individual and the
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unit (an organization), structurally, through dyadic relationships, we 
may note three possibilities: an individual's relationship with another 
individual (I1 —  I2); an individual's relationship to a unit 
(Ix —  Uj_) ; or a unit's relationship with another unit (Ux —  U2) . The 
second example is important in the network study only if conceived in a 
slightly obtuse fashion; namely, an individual's relationship with a 
unit as this relationship corresponds with and bears upon a second 
distinct unit:
I, <---> U,
U2
And furthermore, an individual's relationship with a unit as this 
relationship corresponds with and bears upon another individual and his 
relationship with a unit:
h i2s »• I
I------► Rd^Oi) --- R(I2:02)«----- ;
Ui Ih
Even as we seek to avoid bestowing epistemological primacy upon 
the individual or the unit, one can see how both the individual and unit 
combine to relay the complexity of even a single organizational dyad.
For example, in the statements, "Two organizations worked together. . .1 
or "A task structure was arranged between two organizations. . what
is really being conveyed is some combination of I1  I2 and Ux ---U2;
two different levels of RCI^C^) R(I^:02). This arrangement may be
described as: some social relationship between an individual and a unit
such that the actions of this individual, in such and such a case, are
indistinguishable from those of the unit -- and vice versa.
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In conclusion, organizational identities and activities are 
empirically located through the activities of individuals. In some 
cases, individual actions are synonymous with organizational actions; in 
others situations, they are not. Furthermore, single actors may play 
different roles across different situations such that her/his 
organizational affiliations may only apply to one event out of many.
Once organizational affiliations are validated, there is still the 
matter of an actor's role(s) within the organizational unit. There are 
multiple dynamics to this formulation. For example, in the case of the 
man from NASA (from Case #0420 involving the gulf coast hurricane), his 
relationship to his parent organization was such that he was able to 
secure needed resources for the community. However, his relationship to 
NASA did not prompt his much needed arrival in the beleaguered coastal 
town, rather the fact that he lived there hurried his decision. Another 
example: The building inspector from Case #0365 was a member of both the 
City's Building and Zoning Department and the South Suburban Building 
Officials Association. Therefore, we could say that this individual's 
relationship to these organizations was such that he not only could 
secured needed manpower, but could also develop a Task structure between 
them and secure external legitimation for his efforts.
Exact numbers of members of organizational units also play a role 
in analyzing social networks. If an organization, such as the Office of 
Civil Defense, has only two members, it may be easier to ascertain 
whether or not their activities represent the activities of their parent 
organization. The power and influence of the Office of Civil Defense in 
a disaster response may also affect the nature of member's activities.
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Taking an organization, such as the National Guard, however, the 
empirical location of two representatives would be hard to come by. 
Additionally, again using the National Guard as example, depending on 
the role of these two individuals in the overall organizational 
structure (i.e., whether they are Generals or Privates), their actions 
may either impact the organization as a whole, or "merely" represent it 
in one of many events of relevant activities. The important point 
overall is that social networks are located empirically by 
organizational member's activities. The nature of their role within the 
organization, and consequent actions, can substantially affect the 
characterization of the social network overall.
Multiple Events
From interviews, we know that organizations can be involved, 
simultaneously, in actions which range from complete control of disaster 
activities to the manning of roadblocks. Across these situations, it 
must be ascertained where the actions of individuals representing 
organizations A and B intersected in time and space. And from these 
intersecting lines of action, social networks or rather degrees of 
interdependence are characterized by the code. These collisions of 
organizational personnel and activity, may specify important events 
which link organizations overall -- in some cases, even to the extent 
that one organization merges with another; on the other hand, they may 
signify nothing more than a one-time transfer of resources.
Within these event responses, it must be observed who was there to 
represent these organizations and, finally, what happened? Moreover, did
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the actions occurring within one event, come to affect another event? It 
is because organizational networks are observed across multiple events 
that no emergent unit may be defined prior to analysis. Therefore, the 
emphasis here is not on emergent organization, although this possibility 
is hot excluded, but rather on degrees of interdependence between these 
two units as they interact across the entire spectrum of disaster 
events. This depth of interdependence is distilled from the sum total of 
social networking bonds between organizational units; however, this 
"distillation” process may lead to characterizations which are 
methodologically rather than empirically driven. The notion of 
interdependence is addressed, fully, in what follows.
The disaster event described below will be used to analyze the 
complexity of dealing with multiple events. The disaster scenario 
involves a tornado which struck the city of Wichita Falls; the 
organizational dyad is comprised by the Wichita Falls Police Department 
and the Wichita Falls Traffic Department (case #023:). From the network 
study, the social networking pattern was judged to be R-A-T.
The tornado (some eyewitnesses claimed to see two or three 
fully formed funnels) which struck Wichita Falls on Tuesday, April 
10, carved a mile wide swath of destruction along a 10 mile path. 
Three thousand houses and 140 mobile homes were completely 
destroyed; one thousand addition homes received major structural 
damage, and 1,300 apartment units were blown away (Drabek 
1981:95). While emergency relevant agencies responded even before 
the tornado left town, most of the search and rescue work was 
initially performed by concerned, "unofficial” citizens.
According to Civil Defense planning, city agencies were to 
report to the police department in order to set up an Emergency 
Operations Center --a decision-making body composed of 
representatives from various city agencies: fire, police, civil 
defense, city manager's office, traffic engineering, and public 
works. This EOC became a focal point for the control of the city- 
wide response and the coordination of resources and "peoplepower" 
which began to arrive in droves. The Director of City Traffic was 
initially assigned to coordinate transportation within the city,
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to set up means by which the emergency vehicles could get into the 
disaster area, and to arrange transportation for the search and 
rescue teams to get into the area.
Meanwhile, in the impact area a Captain from the police 
department had begun to set up a command center to coordinate and 
control search and rescue efforts. Hundreds of concerned 
individuals, some from relevant agencies (e.g., volunteer fire 
departments) and others residents, converged at the Safeway 
parking lot command center. The Captain was in charge overall and 
began to organize teams of these individuals to search through the 
wreckage.
Hours later, back at the EOC, the CD Director noted that 
their overall plan failed to designate one set organization to be 
in charge of search and rescue. He then appointed the Director of 
City Traffic to be in charge, "by virtue of his prior training in 
the military, and the fact that he was in charge of 
transportation. . . ". It was then his job to shuffle personnel out 
to the command posts in the field. The command posts would then 
make the decision how to best use these personnel and what areas 
they were to search. According to the police Captain at the 
search and rescue command center: "His contact with the EOC was 
for resources only. He was in charge of making all the decisions 
at the command posts, and he was the top person in charge. . . .
He also set up a temporary morgue behind the posts. It had a 
medical examiner and flight surgeon check on bodies. So therefore 
you could say, his organization began search and rescue activities 
right after the tornado hit. He mentioned that the EOC in Police 
Headquarters wanted him to make another search by Wednesday, and 
another one and another one to make sure that they got everyone, 
because no one could believe there was only 44 dead. But he knew 
that they did a good search, a thorough search on Tuesday, and he 
felt that this was a bit unnecessary."
From the origins perspective, we would note initially the self- 
contained nature of event processes within both the EOC and the search 
and rescue command center. In terms of organization, these events both 
register an internal task structure, the presence of key resources, 
activities related to their prospective domains, and the hint at 
external legitimation. In other words, the encompassing system or unit 
is definable and therefore, interdependence of constituent units is 
interpreted on the basis of this emergent organization.
The network study, too, must analyze dyadic relations across these 
two events, but information gleaned in terms of origins is, in the main, 
disregarded. Here, the problem becomes one of extracting relevant 
actions by organizational participants, from both these events, in terms 
of organizational networks. Thus, from the EOC (Event2), an initial 
resource (R) link is documented as the police department headquarters 
serves as facility for those organizations involved in the EOC including 
the Traffic Department. As with most event portrayals of EOC's, it's 
difficult to fathom the extent and nature of the activities which 
participants engaged in at this location. What of conjoined activities? 
We might speculate that members from these two organizations were, at 
some point, working together under the domain of coordination and 
control through the emergent unit named the EOC; this, however, is not 
documented due to the fact that the predominant disaster-related 
activities of the organizations are judged to revolve around search and 
rescue, not coordination and control. Therefore, organizational 
activities at the EOC become negligible, methodologically and 
empirically. We do know, however, that several hours after impact, the 
head of the City Traffic Department was placed in charge of search and 
rescue efforts (T):
' Event 1 \(EOC)
/
/ \
' \
R-T
/Police <-> Traffics 
/ \
From the network study, it is noted that conjoined activities (A), 
activities conducted at the same time, in the same place, are 
transpiring between members of the Traffic Department and the Police
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Department at the command center. The complete affair is underwritten by 
the police department in conjunction with other participating units such 
as various fire departments, volunteer and otherwise, in the surrounding 
area; it is, in essence, a police operation. The EOC, at this point, 
serves as a clearinghouse, in terms of resources, for the command 
center.
, Evento s(SAR command)
\' \/ \
A
/Police <-> Traffic'
/ '
At which time the head of the Traffic Department is placed in charge of
search and rescue overall, the focus of these resource transfers shifts
from the EOC, as an entity, to the Traffic Department. Therefore, these
two events becomes linked by virtue of the decision to place the Traffic
Department in charge of search and rescue. This may be illustrated in
the following fashion:
Event! (EOC)  ^ ' Events (SAR)
/ ' / \
' \  ' * 
rp / \  / y
x 1 \
1  ' V  '  »
M  / \ I \
E i R-T \ /  A '
/ Police<->Traffic Police<->Traffic \
l (Heads of Depts) / x (Organ. Members) \
/ ' \  ' 
i * v R '/ \ \
/ / Trafficx<-> Police x
1 ' (Head) \ (Officer) \
i /__............ .> *
Now all the pieces of the puzzle are in place and the true 
complexity of the network study is revealed in various ways.
Empirically, it is altogether possible that in some cases the extent of 
organizational action will not surface through the interview data. Even
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if complete information regarding a dyad were attainable, conceptual 
issues would remain. For one thing, in the network methodology, patterns 
of interdependence are fathomed across and between events which span an 
unpredictable amount of time. In the case above, elements characterize 
different and distinct phases within certain events which result in 
recurring element depictions. In other words, there may be multiple task 
structures (T), resource transfers (R), or incidences of conjoined 
activities (A) across events and/or the entire length of the disaster 
response. Nevertheless, those first empirical network ties which bind 
the two organizations (those characterized by the elements), continue to 
serve as the conceptual characterization of the social network for the 
duration of the response -- this even though there may be no event 
continuity, that is, no temporal and substantive continuity between what 
the elements symbolize empirically.
Another point might be made in regards to temporal contingencies 
-- this also relates to both the origins and restructuring 
methodologies. In the origins methodology, the inquiry into emergent 
organization followed the notion of definable, evolutionary states in 
the life-history of an organization. Beginning with the beginning, 
emergent organizations were in the process of becoming up until the 
documentation of the fourth element required for organization truly 
exist. Four elements present and the organization entered into a 
maintenance state. This period of maintenance is the bedrock of the 
restructuring methodology, and even though most, more ephemeral emergent 
disaster relevant organizations do not "live” very long, restructuring, 
in reality, could last for years. For social networks, there is no
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notion of a beginning, no way to tell if a networking relationship has 
entered into a maintenance phase, and consequently no end -- unless, 
possibly, when one organizational member ceases to exist. The 
methodological result of this "timeless" quality, must then deal with 
the potential of multiple element depictions, multiple event sequences 
and one, potentially epochal networking arrangement.
Social Networks and Interdependence
This brings us back, again to the notion of kinds and degrees of 
interdependence. From Thompson, we learn that interdependence, in short, 
regards the situation where the efficacy, survivability, or viability of 
an organization is dependent on some internal, cooperative processes 
between its constituent parts. In true tautological fashion, if an 
organization exists and operates, then, it does so by virtue of the 
interdependent actions of its component parts. In sum, much akin to the 
origins study, a unit is assumed in order to analyze degrees or types of 
interdependence.
The network study, while searching for degrees of interdependence 
between two organizations, does not assume an overall unit. 
Interdependence between dyadic members is characterized according to the 
total disaster response. In some cases, such as Case #055, two 
organizations, or rather personnel representing the Wyoming Air National 
Guard and the Warren Air Force Base Fire; Unit, were engaged in trying to 
secure the National Guard Armory in the aftermath of a tornado. (The 
social networking pattern is defined as T-R-A: a task structure through 
a predisaster mutual aid agreement, resources were derived from the
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special fire fighting equipment supplied by the Warren Fire Unit, and 
conjoined activities from the search and rescue operation which ensued.) 
Because actions between these organizations occurred through one 
temporally and spatially specifiable event, degrees of interdependence 
relate to the joint activities which ensued and the overall operational 
priorities of the event. In other words, in terms of securing the Armory 
from potential fire hazards and searching for victims, as it seems, the 
operation required the cooperation, that is, the interdependent actions 
between these two organizations. The overriding system, although 
unacknowledged, is coterminous with the contextual significance and 
translatable domain for the event as a whole.
It is when the disaster responses of two organizations are linked 
through multiple events with various disaster related activities, that 
this analysis becomes inordinately complicated. For example, from Case 
#004, two organizations, the Osage County Sheriff's Office and the 
Kansas State Park Office, are characterized by social networks which 
span three days and two observable events. The social networking pattern 
is judged to be R-A-T, but this includes two resources transfers 
immediately following the tornado hit the showboat Whippoorwill, an R-A 
network involving the preparation of a missing persons list later that 
evening, and a T-A network two days later which dealt with body 
retrieval (i.e., the networking overall is R-R-R-A-T-A). Distilling 
degrees of interdependence from such a densely packed array of network 
links, without the benefit of a grounding and specifiable event context, 
is quite a different matter from the example above.
It is clear from the interviews, in this case, that these two
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organizations were working closely together; however, by what criteria 
does the analysis distill the "essence" of this social network, in terms 
of degrees of interdependence, from these divergent characterizations. 
Put another way, if Case #055 described above (which involved one 
overall event sequence much like the origins study), would have been 
characterized as R-A-T, could we equate the substantive significance of 
this R-A-T sequence with the R-A-T characterization from Case #004?
In conclusion, for the network study to achieve continuity and 
accuracy in the search for interdependence, social networks between 
disaster relevant organizations should be analyzed by events in much the 
same fashion as the origins Study. In this way, methodological outcomes 
from the network study would read something like, during such and such 
event which involved such and such an operation or emergent unit, 
organizations A and B were observed to be linked in this fashion. From 
this view, degrees of interdependence, from the network study, equate 
nicely with stages in origins of emergent organization. If, however, the 
social networking occurs across multiple and dissociated events, then 
any combination of the elements, ostensibly regarding interdependence, 
would not relate to organization at all. Thus, total number of elements 
present would have nothing to do with stages of organization.
One apparent strength of the network methodology, revolves around 
the possibility that two observable events, involving an organizational 
dyad, may be substantively and empirically linked in some fashion (e.g., 
some organizational members may organize a search and rescue mission, 
while other members actually conduct the search). In this case, the 
holistic view of the disaster response, provided by the network study,
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would prove to provide additional insights into organizational
networking dynamics across events. The origins methodology, in regarding
these same two hypothetical events, may have characterized them both in
terms of emergent units and self-contained processes; in essence,
effectively missing the overall response structure linking the two
events and thus the interdependence and/or organizational potential
between these two organizations at a more inclusive level.
Another dynamic which surfaced during this analysis, which was not
treated in the social network study, deals with the impact of emergent
units upon the array of social networks. Because member units in the
network study were equated with organizational units, no real
consideration was given to the possibility whereby segments of
organizations (i.e., personnel involvement in divergent spheres of
activities) become involved in instances of emergent organization. One
of the theoretical premises on which Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988:19) bases
his conception of organizational dynamics and statics, views that
absorption into more encompassing entities is "death" from the 
standpoint of member units. Intra-organizational forces prevent 
that from happening most of the time (Starbuck, 1983). In 
ecological terms, autogenic (closed system) demands of member 
units are in tension with and largely countervail allogenic (open 
system) demands of the physical and social environment for more 
inclusive forms of organization (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983).
This is true for all organizational units which were involved in this
analysis -- at no time were these organizational units, as a whole,
under any serious threat of "absorption". Be that as it may, there are
cases, such as the Wichita Falls response, where members of these
organizations become involved in separate activity spheres and thus
develop internal processes and dynamics apart from the units from which
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they hail.
In the Mount Saint Helens disaster, organizational involvement was 
scattered across a very involved response structure. A dense array of 
network ties develops between four key organizations (the United States 
Forestry Service and Sheriff's Departments from three abutting 
counties), whereby they are mutually involved in at least three 
Emergency Operations Centers, as well as multiple, more independent 
operations. After four days, these four organizations become involved in 
an overarching EOC (at Toledo, Washington) which is presumably in charge 
of all consequent operations. What of the emergent operations which were 
established prior to the EOC at Toledo? In one very important instance, 
members of the Lewis County Sheriff's Office were involved (and had been 
for three days) with military units from a nearby base. This operation, 
the "ground search command center at Salkum", was headed by a deputy 
sheriff from Lewis County -- one of the four controlling units at 
Toledo. Nevertheless, this operation, even after the creation of the 
controlling EOC at Toledo, did not relinquish its autonomy and continued 
operations which were distinct and sometimes even at odds with the 
Toledo EOC. In sum, regardless of prior affiliations, representatives of 
the same organizational unit were involved in distinct events. These 
events, and the emergent nature of organization explicit in each, 
evidence the same organizational dynamics as separate organizational 
units; that is, they fought to retain organizational autonomy and 
integrity. The network methodology was not structured so as to analyze 
dynamics of this sort.
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Social Networks and the Application of the Code
The networking methodology employs the "tightest** requirements 
regarding application of the elements. The is in part due to criticism 
concerning possible, overly broad interpretations of conceptual 
boundaries for the code. It is also a function of the empirical and 
conceptual subject matter. In what follows, the effect of the social 
network study's unique units of analysis upon the code will be explored. 
Domain
The methodological statement regarding documentation of domain (D) 
for an organizational dyad, asks: Are the units identified and 
legitimated externally as parts of a more inclusive entity? Right away, 
we may note that intra-network processes cannot, in and of themselves, 
result in domain legitimation. In other words, a third party is 
required. Moreover, while it might be noted in passing that the notion 
of "a more inclusive entity" has not been the strong suit of the network 
methodology (in contrast to the origins methodology), the important 
point here is the requirement that external observers must specify one 
social network, presumably among many, for this special assessment. Even 
in cases where emergent entities are in evidence (e.g., as in EOC's), it 
is usually this emergent entity which receives recognition, not 
particular, and arbitrary, pairings of the composite organizational 
units.
In this analysis, only the Mount Saint Helens disaster response 
elicited domain (D) confirmation between organizations. In this example, 
the EOC at Toledo (described above) was definitely at the nexus of 
coordination and control by the fourth day. This EOC was delineated as
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the controlling ’'system" by more than one respondent; however, explicit 
recognition or legitimation went to the EOC, as an inclusive entity, and 
thus to all four organizational participants. Even here, specific 
legitimation for one particular dyad was hard to come by.
Recalling the origins methodology and the designation of an
emergent unit prior to reconstruction by the code, we could say that the
Toledo EOC crossed the threshold of "Being". The consequent analytical
breakdown of this entity, by organizational dyads, in effect,
transferred Toledo's external legitimation to each member unit. This is
not the complete account, however. For the network study to apply domain
(D) to a dyad, it also had to be apparent that the predominant
activities of, and majority of activities from, each organization were
conducted out of this EOC. With this standard, only certain "more
inclusive entities" may be a functional component in the search for
domains (D). Put another way, if the Mount Saint Helens total response
environment were to be analyzed using the origins methodology, more than
likely, multiple instances of emergent organization would be located
across a multitude of event sequences. The external legitimacy (Domain)
granted the activity within each of these clusters would not necessary
survive a breakdown into constituent units, unless it could be shown
that these units were operating mainly out of this site. This
*
prerequisite for legitimation seems, to this reviewer, overly exacting 
-- especially given, at least in the Mount Saint Helens case, the 
severity of the disaster, the scope of the impacted area, and the 
consequent fragmentation of organizational responses.
Still, the point remains well taken, that domain (D), in the
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network study, should specify and identify empirical instances whereby 
organizational units have in some sense "merged" within a more inclusive 
entity -- i.e., a new entity is unleashed. The origins study, in 
essence, presumes organization as "thing" in search of process, while 
the methodology in the social networks study is more accurately 
described as the search for interorganizational process whereby 
"thingness" is much harder to come by. In sum, legitimation for an 
emergent unit, process, or effort (the origins approach), does not 
immediately translate into legitimation for the interorganizational 
processes of participant organizations. On the one hand, there is the 
strategy which allows for easy methodological access to external 
legitimation and thus dilutes the impact of entity status. On the other, 
there is the strategy by which external legitimation of dyads, 
empirically designated by the "merging" of two units, reaffirms the 
magnitude of entity status, but extracts a heavy price in terms of 
methodological austerity.
Tasks
Does the social network have a division of labor that is agreed to 
by member units? The key here relates to the presence of an agreed upon 
division of labor that involves organizational units as a whole. 
Individual members of these organizations may be involved in task 
structures which span events ranging from simple search and rescue 
operations to complex evacuation procedures to state-wide disaster 
response networks. In other words, task structures relating to emergent 
units, and involving organizational members, from the origins study, may 
not correlate with overall organizational involvement. So, how does the
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student of social networks decide when the task structure is 
encompassing of entire units?
One possible empirical and logical conclusion is that heads or 
ranking officials of organizational units are those responsible for 
creating and agreeing to organizational involvement in an overarching 
division of labor. Thus, it is important to note the involvement and 
actions of ranking officials. However, it may also be the case that one 
organization emerges as a focal point for coordination and control; the 
decision-making power of this organization may then "employ" the aid of 
other organizations. One way or another, the point is that a division of 
labor for an emergent unit or effort does not automatically delineate a 
task structure between all organizational units involved.
One example of this caveat comes to us from the Whippoorwill 
incident and pertains to four organizational units, the Osage County 
Sheriff's Office, the Lyndon County Sheriff's Office, the Fish and Game 
Commission, and the Parks and Resources Authority -- six organizational 
dyads. The event revolves around the retrieval of the bodies of those 
who were drowned by the water bound tornado. From the interviews, we 
learn that the Osage County Sheriff was in charge overall and, over the 
course of the disaster response, a division of labor was concocted to 
expedite the recovery of the deceased. While this division of labor, at 
least from the origins perspective, seems to encompass the entire event, 
in actuality (from the social networking; perspective), the task 
structure (T) extends only from the creator to those implicated. In 
other words, a task structure (T) involves only those dyads in which the 
Osage County Sheriff's Office was a member unit.
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A possible explanation for Such a result could derive from, once 
again, the criteria which inquires about a unit's predominant 
activities -- were these organization's predominant activities covered 
by or held within this emergent division of labor? However, in the 
Whippoorwill disaster, it happens that the predominant activities of 
each of these units did revolve around the search and rescue of capsized 
victims. Therefore, in this case at least, the task structure (T) 
appears to take on a contractual or power-oriented base which links the 
unit which created it with those who are implicated within it.
The Mount Saint Helens material yields a different example of the 
application of a task structure. A task structure (T) is said to link 
each of the organizations involved in the Toledo EOC. This is due in 
part to the fact that no one organization was preeminent within this 
group. And while personnel from each of these organizations are involved 
in other important events, each with an emergent task structure, here, 
the predominant activities of these organization's is determined to be 
wrapped up within the conceptual boundaries of coordination and control.
In both cases, from a "holistic” approach, that is, taking the 
entire event as a bastion of interorganizational process, a task 
structure is obviously in evidence. However, it is only the Toledo 
episode which seemingly applies such a holistic approach. The 
Whippoorwill results point to the effect of taking the view of 
organizational dyads in a vacuum; that is, the overarching task 
structure is inconsequential in contrast to a strict interpretation of 
social networks as the unit of analysis.
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Resources
Even in the network study, resources (R) is the element most 
easily applied. Nevertheless, these resources are now linked with inter­
organizational transfers. There are no criteria to designate whether the 
transfers were one-time or continuous; by contract or by perceived need; 
pivotal or tangential. This has never been an issue in any of the 
studies.
There are two particulars, however, which did surface during this 
analysis. One involves the transfers of resources from one unit to 
another where the receiving unit is, in reality, some emergent entity. 
For example, there are examples where important resources were donated 
to Emergency Operation Centers. In this case, who or what units are to 
be judged as the recipient of these resources? Each and every 
organization involved in the machinery of the EOC? From this example we 
see, again, shades of the dynamics of the origins methodology whereby 
resources (R) are not always transferred from one entity to another, but 
rather, identified by their relevance to an emerging unit or 
significance within an event sequence.
The origins perspective has also crept into other examples of 
social networks. In one organizational dyadic network, not explicitly 
analyzed for this study, it was noted that a resource network was 
documented between two organizations where those resources were not, in 
reality, transferred anywhere. The case.involved some high-powered 
military units who were involved in search and rescue operations; 
according to one participant interviewed, they operated autonomously and 
desired to maintain "organizational integrity." One of these units was,
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however, coordinating the effort so that there would be no overlapping 
search missions. All the units had similar resources and all maintained 
their resources for the duration. Nevertheless, a resource link was 
documented between the organization in charge and the other 
organizations who were present. As it seems, even though the resources 
were not transferred from one unit to another, the organization in 
charge, in essence, became synonymous with the effort at large. As the 
effort was benefitted by the additional helicopters from the divergent 
units, so was this controlling unit bequeathed the beneficiary. In sum, 
resources (R) was applied in regards to the event, not to particular and 
observable social networks between organizations.
Activities
For the network study, activities (A) is by far the element most 
affected by the alteration of both units and foci of analysis. For a 
methodology which stresses the applicability and crucial function of 
observable social units, activities (A) could no longer be applied to 
recount the nature of a bounded event -- an event for which individual 
players were unimportant. However, in keeping with the temporal and 
spatial properties of event sequences, the network methodology now 
employs activities (A) in the search for temporally and spatially 
conjoined action. This distinction is really a logical step in regards 
to the analytical breakdown of the constituent units involved in some 
emergent unit or effort. In other words, once the overall emergent 
organization is broken into organizational dyads, the question becomes, 
were organizational representatives, within this temporally and 
spatially bounded event, themselves involved in temporally and spatially
100
conjoined action?
The application of activities (A), in terms of conjoined action,
however, is not observed in relation to an event sequence. As a purely
structural designation, contextual qualifications as to its usage are
not of paramount importance. Thresholds for its application must, by
definition, deal with such matters as: How much time must elapse before
actions are considered conjoined? What are the spatial parameters for
conjoined action? And how many individuals from these organizational
units must be involved?
As Kreps is led to observe, "our judgments about the temporal and
spatial boundaries of conjoined action are quite narrow" (Kreps and
Bosworth, 1988:17). Perhaps, initially, it should be pointed out that
temporal parameters will not always correspond with spatial parameters;
spatial continuity always encapsules temporal. Therefore, it seems that
the spatial criterion are the more critical of the two. And regarding a
numerical threshold, again from Kreps (and Bosworth, 1988),
A precise numerical criterion of conjoined action is perhaps the 
most difficult to identify and apply. Is a meeting involving 
single representatives of dyad members conjoined action? Our 
response is no because we feel that this happening is below a 
threshold of pooled activities (Thompson, 1967). It may be 
important because there is a transfer or exchange of information 
about ongoing events (R). Is sustained involvement (in delimited 
time and space as noted above) of larger numbers or proportions of 
people from each unit conjoined action? Perhaps, but we think a 
criterion of proportional involvement is better applied to member 
activities themselves rather than the sheer number of people 
engaged in them (p.17).
There are two important points which stand out from the quote 
above, both of which qualify the structural nature of conjoined action 
in favor of more contextual or contingent factors. First, the
characterization or notation of organizational activities becomes 
important. In this case, conjoined action is defined first in terms of 
whether or not the activities of enacting persons relate to the 
predominant activities of their parent organization. If they do, then it 
takes fewer participants to cross the threshold of conjoined action.
Many times, however, an organization's predominant disaster related 
activities are discernible only from the sheer numbers of individuals 
engaged in them. In other words, an organization's predominant 
activities become what an organization actually does. This observation 
biases interpretation in favor of "blue-collar" domains or activities.
In this event, the actions of individuals within an Emergency Operations 
Center, for example, become less important conceptually than those of 
the individuals who their decisions ultimately affect. Thus, the 
activities of those individuals within an EOC become relegated to the 
realm of resources (R).
In the second instance, Kreps brings up the notion of pooled 
activities or pooled interdependence as a criteria for conjoined action. 
This has been a continuing source of confusion for this reviewer in that 
how can one speak of interdependence without specifying what the 
organizational unit's and individual's actions are supposed to be 
interdependent in relation to? It could be said that every collectivity 
described in relation to time, space, and number is nothing more, 
nothing less than a crowd. Some crowds are large, and some are small. A 
meeting involving single representatives from, maybe six organizations, 
constitutes a small crowd. This meeting may define and control the 
actions of each constituent organization for the duration of the
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response, the representatives may allocate positions of power and 
responsibility, and they may become the legitimate "spokesgroup" for 
each organization and the larger community. In sum, the "crowd" is an 
organized body, which is dependent upon the continued support of each 
contributing organization. Their actions, representative of their parent 
organizations and interdependent in relation to the "operation" or 
"system" as a whole, do not, however, constitute conjoined action.
This example above, describes exactly the Toledo EOC involved in 
the Mount Saint Helens eruption. From the comforting prescience of 
contextual inquiry, we know that the Toledo EOC directed the efforts of 
the organizations which were represented there. Actions were undertaken 
on behalf of the system, and this system, efficacious or not, was 
dependent on the continued perseverance of its representatives.
Conjoined actions (A) were not documented at this site because it could 
not be said either that 1) the predominant disaster related activities 
of units represented at the EOC were synonymous with coordination and 
control, or that 2) the organizational units were operating 
predominantly out of this EOC.
In other social networking cases, there may be multiple instances 
of conjoined action (A). Like examples where there may be multiple 
instances of resource (R) transfers, the actual conceptual (and 
empirical) significance of these elemental appearances is dependent upon 
either 1) the holistic view of the context for these elements, or 2) the 
notation and thus definition of either resource (R) or activities (A) by 
tasks (T) or domain (D). Since the holistic view is not necessarily 
relevant to the networking methodology, we may assume, in other words,
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that conjoined action (A) (and resource (R)) assumes some empirical, and 
ostensibly, conceptual significance in terms of interdependence when 
coupled with task (T) or domain (D). Since domain (D) is extremely 
difficult to document, it is really task (T) which may 1) delineate one 
observable event or overall effort, 2) define the event in terms of both 
overall character, raison d'etre, and structure of participant 
activities, and 3) the importance of activities or resources within that 
event. In essence, conjoined action (A) cannot, by itself, undeniably 
speak to degrees of interdependence. While it may indeed document 
interdependence in relation to two organizational unit's activities 
under the umbrella of some deliberate joint venture, in conclusion, the 
structural criteria for its documentation, do not guarantee this 
epistemological outcome.
In summary, conjoined activities and the interdependence they may 
represent seem contingent upon a holistic portrayal of unit involvement. 
Furthermore, empirically, it seems that the notion of conjointness 
becomes less crucial in terms of unit interdependencies as more 
formalized units are analyzed. Conjoined action for informal 
collectivities is extremely important. However, for larger units, in 
line with Thompson's argument, tasks (the overall division of authority 
and performance) and technologies seem to be more accurate predictors of 
overall interdependence between component sub-systems.
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DISCUSSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS
Collins has said that he finds activities (A) analytically merged 
within each and every element -- only human beings enact social process 
(correspondence between Collins and Kreps, 1986). Collins, however, is 
seeking to reconstruct social reality via a commitment to the empirical 
and ontological sanctity of the individual. From Warriner we glimpse a 
contrasting explanation of what is to be explained:
Because of the metaphoric origins of the use of the term 
’structure' we must continually reaffirm two basic facts about 
social phenomena in order to avoid major arguments over its use. 
That is, we must continue to remind ourselves (a) that the units 
whose relationships constitute social structure, unlike units in 
physical structure, are not autonomous entities whose character is 
fixed by processes antecedent to and independent of the structural 
processes themselves; and (b) that the relationships of those 
units are not static, spatial dimensions, but activity processes 
between the units. That is, ’social space' is defined by what the 
units do in relation to each other (1981:180).
Here we are introduced to the notion of social "units” where those units
are left unspecified in nature. Consonant with Kreps' epistemological
focus, activity processes between social units constitute the social
phenomenon to be explained. These activity processes are, for Kreps,
construed as forms of association. The activity processes described
above, and the "social space" they inhabit, cannot be delineated unless
some decision is made concerning viable "social units". That is, what
are the units of analysis? To this end, Drabek (1988) has said:
If any form of comparative analysis is to occur, we must delineate 
the object of study. Thus, when asked, "to what can we generalize 
your findings?" we must clearly answer in terms of our units of 
analysis. And some researchers are asking questions wherein events 
are the units, whereas others are focused on individuals,
105
organizations, or what have you (Drabek, 1988: 259).
Thus, from a perspective of theoretical commitments (re Collins and 
Warriner), we are asked to make known what are considered properly 
"ultimate" units of analysis. Kreps, from a structuralist standpoint, 
has stated that both the individual and larger social "entities" (e.g., 
organizations) are equally plausible structural and processual conduits. 
Some attention was given above to the relationship between these two 
units to make the point that both individuals and encompassing social 
units are, at once, separate entities and yet reducible to the other.
This theoretical distinction, however, does not deal with the 
difficulty in reconciling and transposing individual activity with 
organizational activity. In other words, individual and unit enactments, 
which may be mutually constitutive of empirical events, may also be 
broken down into typological categorizations. For instance, concerning 
the individual, some activities are indeed solely representative of the 
individual which enacted them; that is, organizational affiliations are 
irrelevant. In other cases, "individuals are performing boundary- 
spanning functions so as to lace requisite resources from numerous 
autonomous units into a more integrated whole (Drabek, 1988: 261). 
Moreover, in a conceptually generic formulation, we could note that 
individuals, as a result of nonroutine happenings, often 1) take on new 
roles or commitments, 2) instigate new and unique social networks with 
other individuals, 3) combine activity processes with other individuals 
to form larger social units. (Interestingly, these activities or 
processes correspond with the specific organizational enactments 
represented through Kreps' research (restructuring, networking, and
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origins). Thus, micro processes may mimic macro processes on a
conceptual level.) In regards to organizational enactments, Drabek has
introduced a typology which
differentiated between: (1) structural adaptations in ongoing and 
continuing systems; (2) newly created structures that emerged 
within such systems; (3) emergent systems that appeared to span 
across the boundaries of several previously established systems; 
and (4) newly created systems that emerged outside of and 
independent of any ongoing structure (1988:263).
From a methodological standpoint, Drabek statement above (p.113)
emphasizes the importance of making known one's particular analytical
"units of analysis". These form the.conceptual subject matter for any
particular study -- the definable "social space" if you will (from
Warriner) -- whether it be emergent organization, social networks
between organizational units, or discrete unit restructuring.
Ironically, the various researcher commitments to which Drabek refers
(i.e., events, organizations, and individuals), mirror the multitudinous
facets of the complex nature of social reality to which Kreps et al.
have given attention. Studies of origins, for example, focus on events
of organizing. The network and restructuring studies both focused on
organizational dynamics. As of late, individual role enactments have
become an object of inquiry (see Bosworth and Kreps, 1988). And an
important point here is that just as individuals and social units are at
once discrete yet reducible to the other, the methodological foci of the
origins, networking and restructuring studies are at once unique, yet
mutually constitutive of some empirical event sequence or totality.
The potential problem overall, at least in terms of the disaster
scenario, lies in reconciling these typologies of "unit" enactments with
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methodological foci of analysis. Additionally, only by combining these 
two distinctions into some integrated (or conceptually specific) whole, 
may the road be sufficiently clear to yield accurate taxonomic 
portrayals of forms of association. As it stands now, Kreps' structural 
code seems to drive empirical event depictions instead of the other way 
around. The truly generic theoretical property spaces of the elements 
have a way of transcending both unit enactments and methodological focus 
such that taxonomic sequences do not make clear the substantive nature 
of the social phenomena they purportedly describe. The case was made 
above, in reference to this point, that element sequences (such as T-R- 
A) and their conceptual translation, change with regards to a particular 
study. And this is due to the fact that differing units and foci of 
analysis influence the use of the code.
However important it is to state up-front the units and foci of 
analysis -- and then to implement some methodological strategy designed 
for such phenomenon -- there are other hazards. Kreps' studies have 
identified important and researchable aspects of the social 
organizational environment. However, as has been stated throughout this 
thesis, within every temporally and spatially definable event there are 
aspects of social unit emergence, social networking between units, and 
unit restructuring -- interspersed and driven by individual actions 
(Collins, 1986). Furthermore, the reality of emergent entities renders 
the social organizational environment (and the possibility of 
constructing structural hierarchies) a constantly evolving process. 
Therefore, much like the difficulties faced in biological taxonomies, 
even though Kreps' structural code represents a "core species" depiction
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of social structural dynamics, emergent entities (or species) are not 
immediately translatable into generic forms. This is due in part to the 
fact that these entities, or the events in which they occur, may have 
empirical and conceptual properties which relate to more than one study 
(origins, restructuring, or networks) -- much like new species may have 
biological components which span generic descriptive criteria. Were 
these multiple characteristic events to be analyzed according to the 
structural code (is now implemented across the three methodologies), the 
result would yield three unique, and yet uncomplementary or conflicting 
portraits.
Perhaps what needs to be done in some future study is to combine 
the three studies into one overall methodology, and then focus this 
inclusive analytical power onto some disaster-related empirical 
totality. Findings from this cooperative study should, in fact, yield 
important methodological conclusions as the description of events within 
events (and units within units) are made a paramount issue.
Additionally, this tripartite approach may either tighten the conceptual 
boundaries of each element or else, just as importantly, show where 
their conceptual weaknesses lie. This study has begun the process by 
pointing to both the strengths and weaknesses of each of three studies 
and their points of similarity and dissimilarity. Additionally, the 
analysis of Kreps' code, as it is applied to the units and foci of these 
divergent yet complementary studies, ha6> shown that unique element 
imperatives and definitions from each study do not easily make the 
transition to another study. In other words, for example, the tightened 
element definitions and application of the social network methodology,
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were it applied to the origins case materials, would substantially 
reduce the number of emergent organizations found.
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Endnotes
1) Only one methodological reference is made in the origins study about 
the character of actual participants. This was the variable, "Type of 
Focal Organization", which ascertained whether or not the organization 
in question was "emergent groups of individuals" or "emergent groups of 
other groups and organizations." Additionally, this independent variable 
also established whether the focal organization fell within certain 
categories of existing organizations (e.g., public or private 
bureaucracies or voluntary agencies). This is interesting because such a 
characterization seems to designate restructuring rather than emergence. 
Regardless of "type", this distinction did not influence later use of 
the code, except maybe to sensitize the reviewer to the nature of the 
organization (e.g., emergent from individuals would seem to more closely 
reflect collective behavior than emergent from existing organizations).
2) A distinction needs to be drawn here in regards to Kreps' total 
origins case file. Of 423 cases analyzed, only 52 were considered truly 
emergent from either individuals or organizations. The remaining cases 
described, in particular, the restructuring of existing organizations -- 
public or private. The case diagrammed below, while an example of the 
restructuring of a public bureaucracy, nevertheless makes apparent the 
multiple dynamics held within a single event -- regardless of prior 
characterization.
3) For all cases obtained through the DRC archives, descriptions will 
proceed under the cloak of anonymity. In keeping with Kreps' previous 
event descriptions, cases are referred to by number. Because Drabek was 
less stringent in maintaining the anonymity of particular disasters and 
participants, however, case examples from his study will be referenced 
by either name of impacted locale or case number.
4) For a thorough presentation of the notion of extending or expanding 
organizations, see Dynes, 1970.
5) It might be wondered about the situation where activities (A) precede 
domain (D) or tasks (T). How can activities (A) be observed if there is 
as yet no domain (D) or task structure (T) to define it? For the origins 
methodology, since the event has already been noted and an emergent unit 
identified, domain (small D), or that organization's discernable, 
predominant sphere of activities (in relation to the population of 
enacting organizations), has equally been defined. Therefore, activities 
(A) can be observed as the first element if 1) these activities fit the 
emergent unit's overall domain, and 2) these activities in some way 
facilitate the "becoming" of the complete organization (see, for 
example, the event described in the Methods and Issues section under 
"Origins").
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